


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June 2, 1955

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Robert Amory
CIA

SUBJECT: The "Summit" Four-Power Conference

Attached is the material prepared for you by the Special Projects Staff of the OCB for possible use at the coming Big Four Conference.

All of the chapters have been declassified except:

Part I. This is wholly the thinking of members of the Special Projects Staff. This paper is classified "Secret" and should remain so classified. If by the time of the opening of the Conference it is desired to have the whole book handled on an unclassified basis, please remove Part I.

II.3.b. "Peaceful Coexistence". This brief carries the classification "Confidential". Authority for declassification of this material is expected from the FBI by 3 June.

II.6.b. "Communist Truce Violations - Indochina". This draft carries the classification of "Secret". A final draft has been checked with other Agencies and has been declassified. I hope that the new version will be substituted by 3 June when comments from other Departments and Agencies have been introduced into the text.


Chief, Special Projects Staff

Attachment:

MORI/CDF pp6-17

As stated, copy no. II

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THE "SUMMIT" FOUR POWER CONFERENCE

I

The Forthcoming Summit Four Power Conference

Soviet Tactics; U. S. Themes; U. S. Strategy and Tactics

II

Information Briefs in Support of U. S. Themes

1. Communist China and Formosa
 - (a) The Republic of China on Taiwan (Formosa)
 - (b) Sino-Soviet Alliance
2. "The Neutral Belt"
 - (a) Communist World-Wide Control Mechanisms
 - (b) East-West Trade
3. U. S. "Threats"
 - (a) Communist World-Wide Subversion and Sabotage
 - (b) "Peaceful Coexistence" - Soviet Style
 - (c) Soviet Subversion and Espionage in Germany
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5. Disarmament

(a) Treaty and Truce Observance - Communist Style

6. Korea and Indochina

(a) Violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement

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I

THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT FOUR POWER CONFERENCE

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June 1, 1955

THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT FOUR POWER CONFERENCE

This background material in the psychological and communications fields was assembled for the "Summit Conference" primarily to assist U. S. representatives in taking an aggressive stand. The estimates of the course of action presented are based on the best intelligence available. The proposed U. S. tactics were suggested by intelligence and by experience in connection with previous conferences. The discussion is arranged in three sections...

- A. Soviet tactical themes or "lines" expected to be used before, during and after the conference.
- B. Suggested U. S. themes and intelligence support available for these themes.
- C. Suggested tactics for the exploitation of U. S. themes.

A. Soviet Tactics

According to existing intelligence, the tactical "lines" submitted below are likely to be used by the Soviets. It is not possible to indicate which will be used or in what order they will be presented. It is important, therefore, to prepare for contingencies.

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General

The present moves of the Communists in Europe, including the summit conference, will be designed to conceal or gain their objectives in Asia, where the advance of the international Communist movement is having its greatest success. The neutralization of Germany is a strategic objective. Any concessions by the West will assist the Soviet's strategic planning which includes the neutralization and absorption of Germany and Japan into the Soviet orbit. Revolution in Asia is their present tactic; the tactic is a stepping stone to "world revolution", which means the introduction everywhere of Soviet Communism directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

It is believed that long-range Soviet maneuvering at the conference will be aimed at a Four Power Foreign Ministers' conference after "summit" to discuss Far Eastern problems. Out of the Foreign Ministers' meeting will evolve a discussion of Formosa by a Ten Power conference, including the United States, Communist China, and a group of neutral countries. Nationalist China will undoubtedly be excluded. Any concessions by the West on Germany, disarmament, East-West trade, and a possible neutral belt will be mere windfalls since the Soviets' present objectives are in Asia, Asia as spelled out by Quemoy and Matsu, Formosa, South Vietnam, Thailand, Korea and Japan.

"The Neutral Belt"

As early as 1951, Pravda stated that the practical value of neutral tendencies in Germany, India, and the Arab countries must

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not be ignored. Since then, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Scandinavian countries and Italy have been added to the list. Also, as early as 1951, Pravda predicted that neutralists would join the Soviets in demanding the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, the ending of the Korean War, and a Five Power peace pact. Early in 1954, during the Berlin Conference, the neutralists' "line" took on a new slant, that of the Soviet-sponsored All-European Collective Security Agreement. The 1955 version is the creation of a neutral belt. This neutral belt tactic, however, is directly tied to the peaceful coexistence campaign. The Soviets want the European nations gradually to limit their commitments to NATO or maintain a Western European alliance outside of NATO. This desire has led to the Warsaw Conference and the subsequent U.S.S.R. Satellite Treaty of Mutual Assistance as well as the Austrian Treaty.

Communist China and Formosa

At the summit conference the Soviet omnibus items, i.e., recognition of Communist China, entry of Red China into the UN and the need for Five Power Foreign Ministers' talks will be introduced. The primary objective, however, will be a future conference on Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa which would include the United States, Communist China as major participants and a group of neutral countries as moderators. The end goal, of course, will be the surrender of Quemoy and Matsu, and the neutralization of Formosa. The German issue will also be a cover to induce the West to agree to further conferences. The initial request for the Five Power Foreign Ministers'

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meeting will be watered down to a Four Power meeting, provided Germany and Formosa are agenda items. Indochina and Korea will be included as diversionary items.

Germany

Where Germany is concerned, reunification will be the main bait. Much of German opinion is fascinated by the prospect of Austria regaining its freedom and by the withdrawal of the Red Army. Communist propagandists are now tirelessly expounding the theme of the Swiss and Austrians whose example Germany would be wise to follow. Some of the German Social Democrats in West Germany have swallowed the bait. Ulbricht, Secretary General of the Social Unity Party (SED) of East Germany, stated in Leipzig:

"The two great power blocs should at least be separated by a broad belt of neutral states. The conclusion of the Austrian Treaty adds a further link to this belt. Only a reunified Germany is still missing".

There are two glaring exploitable flaws in this Soviet "line"-- one in the realm of theory; one in the realm of reality. In the realm of theory the Soviet aims are not neutralization of any group of countries but a temporary tactical move, fitting present conditions, that would lead to the eventual absorption of these countries into the Soviet orbit. In the realm of reality, the Germans are being asked to come to terms with the Soviet-puppet regime of East Germany. A genuinely democratic Germany would be worth nothing to the Soviets. A reunited but contaminated Germany, which could be subverted by pro-Soviet forces, would be invaluable to the U.S.S.R., especially if

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Western Europe were so weakened as to insure ultimate Communist domination of the Continent.

If the Soviets cannot foresee early unification on their terms, they will fall back upon their old argument of postponing elections until after reunification. This will be the least awkward way of rejecting Western proposals on Germany.

Austria

The Austrian Treaty was aimed primarily at German public opinion. This is readily apparent if the significance of the Russian military withdrawal is examined. The U.S.S.R. signed an Austrian Treaty and withdrew its occupation troops without substantially reducing its military strength in Europe, impairing the security of its satellites or reducing the effectiveness of European Communist-front organizations. The Soviet forces in Austria total 31,000 troops (two divisions) and 2,500 security troops in contrast to a force of 400,000 troops (22 line divisions) and 15,000 security troops in East Germany. The Soviet air force has 6 jet fighter regiments in Austria in contrast to 20 jet fighter and 6 jet light bomber regiments in East Germany. The ratification of the Warsaw Agreement setting up a unified Eastern European military command will give the Soviets a pretext of keeping their troops in the satellite states. The Austrian Treaty abrogates the "line of communication" security provision by which the Soviets have stationed troops in their satellites. The Warsaw Agreement will be used to refuse any request to withdraw their troops.

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If the Soviets cannot foresee early unification along their terms, they will fall back upon their old argument of postponing elections until after reunification. This will be the least awkward way of rejecting Western proposals on Germany.

The U.S. "Threatening" Attitude

This is one of the omnibus themes likely to be used by the Soviets to postpone discussion of Germany, to avoid Western challenges, to split the allies, and to conceal embarrassment. A variety of sub-themes can be played: (a) U.S. "neglect" of the problem of prohibition and control of atomic weapons, (b) U.S. world-wide military bases, (c) alleged U.S. subversive activities in Eastern Europe, (d) U.S. alliance with "Hitlerite" generals, (e) aggressive character of NATO, SEATO and Paris agreements. The slogans currently being used to highlight the above are "peaceful coexistence", "the U.S. does not want to reduce international tensions", and "SEATO is nothing more than military plotting of the colonizers."

Disarmament

The latest Soviet disarmament proposals are nothing more than a clever tactic to confuse and obstruct any real settlement. All proposals would work to the detriment of the Western powers while the Soviets would be allowed to continue their aggressive activities. Their proposals, if agreed to and carried out to the letter, would bring about: the halting of freedom of information on Communist

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activities; the dismantling of U.S. overseas bases; the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and the Far East; the surrender of Formosa; and the elimination of restrictions on East-West trade. All the above would be carried out prior to any effective disarmament or inspection system. The methods, techniques and pitfalls of "Inspections - Communist Style" have been demonstrated in Korea and Indochina.

Korea and Indochina

The unification of Korea and Vietnam will be the main themes of the Soviet "line". Korea will be treated as of passing interest, since the Communists are not ready to renew hostilities. War, in Soviet dialectics, is the final coup when the success of the revolution is assured. The present strength of South Korea and the U. S. and the willingness of the UN to fight if the Communists break the truce will preclude any aggressive acts.

In Vietnam the main theme will be unification and elections. Events are now progressing along lines favorable to a Communist victory. Unless the situation begins to change sharply in favor of the South Vietnam Government, conditions will continue to deteriorate. They will claim the success of the Korean and Geneva Agreements and back a continuation of the truce inspection commissions. The continuation of the truce will give them a respite in order to strengthen their subversive activities which they consider preparation for the "revolution".

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B. U. S. Themes

The themes reviewed hereafter can be used as part of United States strategy or in countermoves inspired by Soviet tactics.

Communist China and Formosa

The German issue will be used by the Soviets as a lead to a discussion on Far Eastern issues. This means that the United States must be prepared to counter any developments which might weaken the position of the Western allies in the area. At the same time they should exploit Far Eastern vulnerabilities of the Soviets. Since the main issue will be Formosa, the Sino-Soviet Alliance should be aired and reasons given for the United States commitment to defend Formosa against Communist attack. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to defend Formosa and explain the reasons for the program of military assistance to the Government of the Republic of China.

"Neutral Belt"

The purpose of this Soviet theme is to weaken or destroy NATO, SEATO and the Paris Agreements. Its main objective is the neutralization of Germany and eventually Japan with the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and the Far East. Since the "neutral belt" is a tactic designed to achieve

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strategic concepts, the best defense is an offense. We should strike hard at the theme of neutralization of the satellites. The counter-offensive should exploit the Soviet control mechanisms over the satellites, including both political and economic. The iron curtain and slave labor in the satellites are secondary themes which can be utilized.

The U. S. should make clear that what the Soviets propose is not a neutral position between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but a weakening of many countries by destroying their alliances with the United States.

U.S. "Threats"

Soviet "line" on any of the so-called "threats" will be an obvious propaganda maneuver designed to conceal their true objectives and will also be part of their over-all "Hate America" campaign. The countermove on this item should give evidence of Soviet subversion and espionage throughout the world and especially Soviet subversion and espionage in Germany. An explanation of the significance of the term "peaceful coexistence", as used by the Soviets, would be effective in clearing up confusion on that subject.

Austria and Germany

The Soviets will attempt to propagandize the Austrian Treaty and use it as a bait for similar neutralization of Germany. The

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appeal will be aimed at the German people. The U.S. countermove to the German problem is to explain the fact that Germany differs from Austria in that there is no comparison in their size and strength, and in that the Germans are being asked to come to terms with Soviet puppets of the Ulbricht type. In order to expose the fraudulent nature of Soviet pronouncements, the true facts should be brought up on the following issues:

- (a) East German militarism
- (b) "Free" German Elections - Communist style
- (c) East Germany - a Soviet colony
- (d) Forced Labor in East Germany

Disarmament

Soviet disarmament proposals are merely propaganda designed to attract the neutralists and play on man's desire for peace. On close examination they are all seen to be based on the same Soviet objectives; i.e., to find a cover for the real intent of Soviet Communism; to achieve the withdrawal of troops from Europe; to secure the dismantling of U.S. overseas bases; to eliminate trade restrictions; to neutralize Formosa; to secure recognition of Communist China and to win disarmament before inspection. The main item that will be exploited by the Soviets is that of atomic weapons. This will lead to the inspection item which has bogged down all previous disarmament conferences. The United

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States countermove should center around the point of inspections and, in particular should expose the Communists' use of inspections to gain advantage over their foes.

Korea and Indochina

The Communists will claim success for the Korean and Geneva Agreements, both of which have been flagrantly violated. Their main theme will center around reunification, but this will be a propaganda cover. The issue of elections and inspections will arise. This should be exploited by an exposure of Soviet truce and treaty violations to include actual violations of the Korea and Geneva Agreements.

C. U. S. Strategy and Tactics

Since the date for the summit conference has not been definitely agreed upon, this affords us time for preparations which should include (a) moves to counter Soviet tactics; (b) moves to push ahead toward U.S. strategic goals. Although we cannot prepare in detail for all Soviet moves, our position should be flexible enough so that we can counter any Soviet tactic to the advantage of the United States.

Our over-all plans should envisage a defeat of Soviet strategic moves and not tactical maneuvers. Soviet strategic goals are:

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1. Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and the Far East.
2. Neutralization of Germany, Japan and Formosa.

The tactical moves of the Soviets can best be countered by an exposure of their over-all policy as guided by their theoretical teachings. This will expose their highly publicized peace and disarmament campaigns. It will also reveal the true nature of Soviet Communism.

To assist U.S. media it is imperative to have United States strategy planned in advance. We must not under any circumstances allow the Soviets to gain the initiative or allow them to lead us toward their strategic goals.

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II

INFORMATION BRIEFS IN SUPPORT OF U. S. THEMES

TAB

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN (FORMOSA)

The Republic of China on Taiwan (Formosa), aided by military and economic programs in which we are participating heavily, stands literally and figuratively as a rallying point for all Chinese who oppose the Communist oligarchy which aims to keep the Chinese people in bondage and use them for the further attainment of their evil objectives. The Chinese Government and its people on Formosa are redoubtable members of the confraternity of free peoples who are ready to take their stand against further Communist conquests.

In view of the limitations imposed by relatively small geographic, manpower and economic resources, care must be taken not to overestimate that government's material capabilities. The strongest force they can muster and support is none too large for the threat they face. In the no less important moral and psychological spheres their value to the common cause is enormous. The Government of the Republic of China is essentially with us. It is a government with which we can negotiate on a rational plane. We are dealing with it on a sane basis of give and take.

We are rendering substantial help to this government without intervening in its domestic affairs or otherwise infringing on its sovereignty. We are helping a beleaguered people to help themselves and the common cause. It is a program from which we can derive some satisfaction. It is our purpose to continue to back this government.

We believe that it is the only Chinese Government which represents in any measure the authentic aspirations and the bona fide national interests of the Chinese people.

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Disillusioned though the mass of the Chinese may have been with it in the dark days of 1948-49, its record on Formosa makes it look better and better to the Chinese people on the mainland by contrast with the ruthless exploitation which they are suffering at the hands of the regime of Mao Tse-tung. There is reason to hope that the government at Taipei will continue to grow in strength, in devotion to the cardinal principles of democracy, and in international prestige, and that its base of free Chinese support will steadily be broadened so that it will be enabled to raise ever higher a standard around which all Chinese may rally who wish to save from extinction Chinese freedoms and the ancient and distinctive Chinese traditions.

The overwhelming majority of the American people do see this issue in proper perspective. But an articulate though small minority in our own country, and more in some other countries, sometimes seem to fail to distinguish friend from foe. Some of our friends in various parts of the world confuse Communist imperialism with bona fide nationalism.

Nonrecognition of Communist Regime

"Since recognition doesn't signify approval, why don't we 'accept reality' and recognize the Chinese Communist regime which is in full control of the country?"

To start with, let us take a look at the four generally accepted criteria which a new regime ordinarily must meet before its recognition as a legitimate government and its acceptance into the sisterhood of nations. These four criteria are (1) effective control over the territory of the country; (2) sovereign independence; (3) truly representative character--

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something in the nature of a mandate from the people governed, or at least their consent without coercion; and (4) acceptance of its inherited and generally recognized treaty and other international obligations and adherence to a pretty well established minimum standard of decency in its treatment of foreign nationals and interests within its borders.

Of these four criteria it would seem that the Peiping regime meets only the first and that is perhaps the least essential of the four.

Repeatedly we have recognized governments in exile which could not meet the first criterion. But it would be a serious matter to overlook the other three tests.

The Chinese Communists do not measure up under any of them. They are subservient to Moscow and international communism; they impose an alien minority rule by force and falsification on an intimidated, isolated and misinformed populace; and they openly flout every Chinese treaty obligation, every principle of the U.N. charter, and every clause in any reasonable formulation of human and property rights for aliens.

Apart from the horrors wantonly inflicted on millions of Chinese since 1949, the story of the flagrant abuse of scores of American citizens is one which rightfully causes us to burn with wrath.

The shocking crimes against humanity of recent years have blunted world sensitivity to mass sadism so that we no longer seem to express the full measure of our moral indignation against these great wrongs. But we cannot lightly dismiss the agony of our fellow citizens arrested by Chinese Communists on trumped-up charges; held incommunicado for months or years without access to friends or legal counsel and often without knowledge of what offense

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if any is charged against them; and in many cases subjected to physical or mental tortures aimed at extorting false confessions that can be used in the vicious hate-America propaganda campaign, a campaign which unhappily may in time turn a new generation of Chinese against America and Americans by a systematic poisoning of their minds against this country beginning in childhood.

On grounds of international law, the case against recognition is very strong. On practical grounds, the argument is equally strong.

Recognition has assumed a political and psychological significance which is new. It has become a symbol. Recognition in this case would mean in the eyes of millions, especially in Asia, not necessarily approval but acceptance, accommodation, and reconciliation.

Nonrecognition means refusal to accept the Communist triumph as definitive. It means to many that the will to resist Communist expansion is alive; that communism is not the inevitable "wave of the future" for Asia; that communism is not assured of acceptance and legitimation in every country where it may gain a beachhead; that our Asian friends who have the courage to stand up against communism will not have the ground cut out from under their feet if communism should attempt to subvert or take over their native land.

Some may be unable to see why the recognition issue should signify all this; but the fact is that it does to many Asians, including numbers who are "on the fence." Many an Asian has told me that American nonrecognition of the Communist regime in Peiping has had much to do with checking the impetus of the Communist advance in Asia.

Even Chinese who are not particularly in sympathy with the Chinese National Government tell us that recognition of the Communist dictators in

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Peiping would be the greatest single nonmilitary triumph for the Communist cause and the hardest psychological blow against the will to resist the further spread of communism that could be devised.

It would be an unthinkable betrayal of the Chinese Government and its people on Formosa and likewise a grave disservice to the mass of Chinese people on the mainland suffering under Communist dictatorship. Our friendship for them shall not waver, and it demands that we shall not strengthen the hand of their oppressor.

The Communist side is becoming increasingly aware of the immense political and psychological advantages, as well as the parliamentary advantages in the United Nations, which could be obtained from general worldwide recognition of the Peiping regime. Hence we are beginning to see a series of maneuvers out of Moscow and Peiping designed to force the general international acceptance of the Mao Tse-tung regime as the legitimate government of China, entitled to occupy China's seat in the United Nations. This endeavor must be resisted.

We see in the arrogant, incorrigible, unyielding position taken by Chinese Communist mouthpieces wherever they appear at a conference how difficult it is to negotiate even the simplest matter with them. The current negotiations in Korea are an example. The patience, the flexibility, the open-mindedness, the reasonableness and resourcefulness of even a consummately skilled negotiator are largely wasted.

There is nothing to be gained from diplomatic relations with such a regime, which believes in the use of diplomacy as a weapon of propaganda and subversion rather than as a means of constructive diplomatic intercourse.

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The ambitious plans of the Peiping regime to build its industrial base for war through a comprehensive 5-year economic development plan are deeply disturbing. There is no reason to believe that its longstanding plans for expansion in Asia have been modified.

[Extracts from Department of State Publication 5383, Address "China in the Shadow of Communism" by Walter P. McCaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.]

TAB

June 1, 1955

THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE

The belief that Chinese Communism is in some mysterious way different from that of the U.S.S.R. has persisted among many observers despite the fact that Chinese Communist leaders since 1921 have stated the closeness of their ties with Moscow.

Thus, Mao Tse-tung, in the major statement of policy he made on July 1, 1949, entitled "On the People's Dictatorship," wrote:

"Internationally, we belong to the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union, and we can look for genuine friendly aid from that front, and not from the imperialist front."

Again, on July 16, 1954, at Peiping, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces, Chu Teh (also a member of the Politburo) said:

"It can be easily seen that the victory of the Chinese people's democratic revolution is inseparable from the friendly aid of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union does not exist, if there is no victory of the anti-fascist second World War under the leadership of the Soviet Union, if there is no such development as the unprecedented growth since 1944 of the world democratic peace front under the leadership of the Soviet Union, the rapid and quick victory of the Chinese revolution as it is today would have been impossible. Even if we were to succeed, it would be impossible to consolidate our gains. Is this not clear?"

Such statements are nothing more than confirmations of a common bond, and dedication to common objectives of world conquest, that have existed between the Chinese and Soviet Communists since the early Twenties. Since the Soviet Union first turned its attention actively to Asia then, there has been constant intercourse between China and Russia. The Soviet Union has sent agents to China to aid in the long effort that culminated

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with the capture of all the mainland in 1949. Hundreds of Chinese who now occupy key positions in the Peiping regime were intensively trained in the Soviet Union -- always toward the end that they would think of themselves as agents of the Communist world program first, and Chinese second. For example, in the Twenties, when Trotsky blundered in China, it was the present Chinese leadership that adhered to Leninist orthodoxy. When, in 1935, the Comintern adopted the Popular-Front line, the Chinese Communists followed it. When, from 1939 to 1941, Moscow referred to the war in Europe as an imperialist war and adopted an isolationist position, the Chinese Communists slackened their efforts against Japan and intensified their efforts to build their internal power. When, after June 22, 1941, Moscow renamed the imperialist war a war for freedom and democracy, Yen-an echoed the slogan. And when, after Stalingrad, the Russians began to set the stage for the creation of the post-war puppet states in Europe, the Chinese Communists resumed their drive for the kind of power in China that could lead to power in Asia.

With this unparalleled history of strict adherence to Soviet leadership, the Sino-Soviet alliance has now undertaken a major program to build a powerful, modernized military force, backed by an industrialized economy as a means of completing the Asian phase of the program of world conquest drafted in the Kremlin more than three decades ago. Every aspect of governmental effort in China is shaped to contribute to this goal. The achievements of the

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Soviet Union are taken as the basic guiding pattern, with only such modifications as are required by peculiar Chinese conditions.

In addition to the physical goals of the Sino-Soviet alliance being made clear, Communist doctrine in both Moscow and Peiping give evidence regarding the methods whereby these goals will be achieved. In order to provide time for their program the Communists are adopting such tactics as "united front" arrangements and "truce" or "armistice" agreements in order to "lessen tensions" on their periphery. The Sino-Soviet alliance is based on the realization of the tremendous influence the two parties can exert on world affairs through close association, and if they can buy time through the attraction of a "coexistence" tactic their ideology possesses some hope of surviving in a world of "lessening tensions".

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13 January 1955

Communist World-Wide Control Mechanisms

Soviet Basic Doctrine is aimed at a Socialist (Communist) world dominated from Moscow. The Moscow-trained Soviet colonists are a militant group sent to all countries of the world to subvert the existing forms of government and establish piecemeal the Soviet Socialist Republics of the world.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union contains the Section for Liaison with Foreign Communist Parties. This is usually referred to as the Foreign Section of the Central Committee.

The Foreign Section is the only channel for liaison with foreign Communist parties. Its importance is emphasized by the fact that it was directed by Mikhail A. Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee. The Cominform is under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Section as well as the editorial staff of the Cominform newspaper printed in Bucharest.

Suslov's duties are almost entirely devoted to liaison with foreign Communist parties. All Cominform meetings, held always in Satellite countries and attended by representatives of Communist parties from the non-orbit areas, are conducted by Suslov.

The Foreign Section of the Central Committee directs, controls and supports world-wide Communist movements. It also directs and controls Communist-front organizations, VOKS, Anti-Fascist Soviet Youth Committee, the Anti-Fascist Soviet Women's Committee and others.

Control of foreign Communist parties, espionage nets and various front units is within the apparat of the Central Committee of the

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Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Control of the Satellites is more direct and open. The party leaders in the Satellites have in virtually all cases been trained in Moscow. For all intents and purposes they are Soviet citizens, completely subservient to Moscow. Army and police controls are also direct and in most cases overt.

I

USSR Control of Foreign Communist Parties

During the past thirty years the Soviet control mechanisms have gone through a series of changes of which the most significant occurred during and after World War II. These will, for descriptive purposes, be divided into the 1919-1943 (Comintern) period, the 1943-1951 and the 1951-1954 periods.

a. 1919-1943. - During this period the foreign section of the Central Committee exercised control of foreign Communist parties through the Comintern. The Third (Communist) International was established in Moscow in March 1919 and signified Soviet control of the international Communist movement. As set forth in the Constitution of the Comintern, the Executive Committee was one of the two bodies elected by the World Congress of the Communist International. The other was the International Control Commission. The Executive Committee, the leading body of the Communist International between Congresses, elected from among its members the Praesidium, a permanent body carrying out all businesses of the Executive Committee. The Praesidium in turn elected from its membership the Secretariat, which functioned as the executive body for the Praesidium.

Comintern. - The Comintern was an international organization of representatives from all Communist parties. It provided policy guidance

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and integration for the various Communist parties and was directed by the Soviet Politburo. The headquarters was located in Moscow and had between 2,000 and 2,500 functionaries. It was a powerful instrument into which men from all countries of the world and from all the existing Communist parties were integrated. It was directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and served the Soviet State. But, in turn, it controlled millions of adherents who received the doctrine of the "leading socialist country", the USSR.

The Comintern's Executive Committee was composed of representatives from all Communist parties of the world, while the Secretariat had representatives from only the leading Communist parties. The Comintern's control apparatus or headquarters was divided into two parts, overt and covert:

The overt side had a section responsible for the compilation of the data furnished by the heads of the Communist movements; an information and press (propaganda) section with the mission of keeping current and briefing all foreign news throughout the world; a school section, charged with organizing courses for the political and ideological education of the cadres of foreign Communist parties; archives; a library with a secret section which contained all books prohibited in the USSR; and a technical section with the sole duty of organizing foreign travel to and from the USSR.

The covert side contained a section which exercised direct control of Communist cadres by NKVD functionaries; a small secret section in the information and press section which controlled a series of covert agencies that released sensational news to provoke given situations in the interest of the USSR; and a secret apparatus which operated under cover of a travel agency, but which contained

over 50 NKVD members. The covert side maintained contact with all countries and the Comintern delegates in these countries. The functions were to receive or send secret material and directives to secret Comintern agents and to transmit funds.

Members of the Secretariat responsible for the different sections in the international Communist movement were as follows: Kolarov - Balkans; Pieck - Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria; Florin - Scandinavia; Togliatti - France and Italy; Andre Marty - England and the United States; Dolores Ibarruri - Spain, Latin America and India; a Japanese (name unknown) - Asia. Gottwald was editor of the Comintern publication titled "The Communist International."

The Comintern was the "General Staff for World Revolution". It was headed by Georgi Dimitrov who was controlled by Dmitriy Z. Manuilski. Manuilsky was, in turn, controlled by the Central Committee Zhadanov. The cadres and secret sections were controlled by NKVD members, Shorkin, Bielov and Blagoeva and they, in turn, were controlled by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. This apparatus insured that no foreign Communist Party could function independently either financially or politically.

b. 1943-1951. - This period was highlighted by the nominal dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 and the transfer of its functions into the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee.

The Soviet press and radio general directives were no longer left to local interpretations. A new entity, the Cominform, was created in 1947. It was intended to strengthen the Communist

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parties "in their resistance to plans of imperialist expansion and aggression along all lines--state, political, economic and ideological." Direction of Communist parties and fronts still rested with the Central Committee through the sensitive channel in the local directorates of the MGB and Soviet General Staff in each Soviet foreign mission to the local Communist parties. In other words, little change had taken place except that the Comintern apparatus was now directly within the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee.

Dissolution of the Comintern. -- In early 1943, high-level Nazi propagandists began a campaign to expose to the Soviet Union's World War II allies the nature of International Communism, which had been working through the Comintern. Since these facts were detrimental to the Soviets, the dissolution of the Comintern was announced as a sop to the United States and Great Britain. The Second World War, in which the Soviet Union engaged in a life and death struggle with Nazi Germany, brought to a temporary halt the Communist plan to Sovietize the world. Sorely in need of financial and military assistance from non-Communist countries, the Comintern had to pass through all the phases of a respectable demise.

Igor Gouzenko, the cipher clerk attached to the office of the Soviet military attache in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, in a statement made on 10 October 1945 to the Royal Commission said:

"The announcement of the dissolution of the Comintern was probably the greatest farce of the Communists in recent years. Only the name was liquidated, with the object of reassuring public opinion in the democratic countries. Actually the Comintern exists and continues its work."

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The reasons advanced by the Communists for this hoax are:

- (1) The Communist International from the first exposed the real meaning of the anti-Comintern Pact as a weapon for the preparation of war by the Hitlerites. Long before the war it ceaselessly and tirelessly exposed the vicious subversive work of the Hitlerites, who masked it by their screams about so-called interference of the Communist International in the internal affairs of these states. (This was typical Communist propaganda to attempt to justify the Comintern activities in the U.S. and Great Britain, while minimizing its activities against the non-Communist countries allied with the USSR during the war.)
- (2) The Comintern had outgrown developments, served its purpose in the first stage of the working class movement and had become a drag on the further strengthening of the national working class parties.
- (3) Taking into account the growth and political maturity of the Communist parties and their leading cadres in various countries, the Comintern frees their sections from their obligations arising from the statutes and resolutions of the Congresses of the Communist International.

Enrique Castro Delgrado, a leader of the Spanish Communist Party, who fled to Russia in the spring of 1939 after the defeat of

the Spanish Republic and who became a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern at the time of the so-called dissolution, has the following to say about points (2) and (3) above.

"There exists no political and ideological maturity in the Communist Parties and therefore any argument justifying the dissolution of the Comintern is false."

Concerning the nominal disbanding of the Comintern he states:

"It only altered some of its operating procedures. The Comintern boss, Georgi Dimitrov, moved his office to the third floor of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union....

"Other secretaries set up their offices in different places....

"Those who edited the secret broadcasts served under Friederick instead of Togliatti. Friederick transmitted the scripts to Togliatti who in turn transmitted them to Dimitrov....

"The chiefs of the foreign delegations continued to confer daily with Dimitrov....

"The leading figures in the various Communist Parties continued their activities....

"The foreign reporters of the Communist press continued to file regular reports with the information and propaganda section of the 'dissolved Comintern'....

"The secret section of the 'dissolved' Comintern remained on the main floor of the old Comintern and continued to receive reports from the foreign Communist parties, sending one copy to Dimitrov and another copy to Zhdanov....

"The secret section continued to send Dimitrov's instructions to various Communist Parties abroad and to organize trips to and from Moscow....

"The Comintern agents abroad, such as Cadovila in Latin America and Browder in North America continued to go on with their work - as if the Comintern had not been 'dissolved'."

The Cominform. -- In October 1947 the Soviet Government established the Cominform. This act constituted, in effect, a declaration of economic and political war against the United States and heralded the beginning of the cold war.

The Cominform is primarily an association of representatives of the Communist parties of the European satellite countries and is covertly directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Cominform's primary function is to provide integrated direction to the Communist parties.

Moscow's major problem of foreign policy began in March 1947, when the United States announced policies of military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. In Paris, on July 3, 16 nations proceeded to implement Europe's role in the Marshall Plan. The Soviets therefore had to create a specialized Information Bureau which they claimed was to:

- (a) Expose and prevent the possibility of new aggression on the part of Germany and to create prolonged co-operation of all sides among the peoples of Europe.
- (b) Expose the United States, which had an agreement with England to eliminate competitors in the world market in order to establish a dominant position for the two countries.

Thus, the East-West split was formally acknowledged. Communist parties and fellow travellers often had difficulty in interpreting and analyzing Soviet policy as set forth by the Soviet radio and press. This was corrected by specialized direction and interpretation from the Cominform. The difficulties encountered from these general directives were described by Louis Budenz, former Managing Editor of the Daily Worker:

"The Party bureaucrats are so absorbed in watching what Pravda says each day, checking the radio for Soviet statements and trying to decipher what messages are being conveyed, that they frequently lose sight of American technique. This is not what Stalin and other Soviet overlords want or expect, but it is almost inevitable in any such puppet-like setup as

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the Party leadership. Very conveniently, they do not have to do any fundamental thinking--they just let Moscow do it for them. But the constant tension of trying to catch every hint and order sent from abroad is a man-size job in itself. And then they have to make sure that they are doing everything according to the specification of the order.

"...When the line changes, as one shrewd and outstanding comrade said in an unguarded moment, we have to beat our breasts and pretend the last line was carried out badly in order to hide the fact that we act on word from across the sea."*

c. 1951-To Date. - Traditionally, the intelligence directorate of the Soviet General Staff served as the liaison and communications link with foreign Communist parties, even before World War II and the dissolution of the Comintern. In 1951, by a decision of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, the responsibility for liaison with the foreign Communist parties was taken away from the intelligence directorate of the Soviet General Staff and turned over to the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the then MGB. The Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee does not have any permanent representatives abroad. In special cases a representative may be sent on a flying visit, but normally liaison with foreign Communist parties is effected through the representatives abroad of the foreign intelligence directorate of the MVD.

Correspondence with Moscow on Communist Party matters is given special security handling. Even within the foreign intelligence directorate representation abroad there is an effort to conceal the existence of any liaison with local Communist parties.

The present specific tactical direction of foreign Communist parties is from the Central Committee's Foreign Directorate, through MVD channels. The foreign intelligence directorate operates through

*Louis F. Budenz - This is My Story, p. 221.

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its representatives in the Soviet missions abroad. An MVD line also extends into the Soviet Satellite missions operating abroad. When the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee sends a representative to foreign Communist parties, he is likely to be a party man with MVD training, since an MVD man can be expected to have greater familiarity with the craft of covert contact.

"Legal" representatives of the foreign intelligence directorate as well as Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel abroad are categorically forbidden to recruit Communist Party members without special permission from Moscow. Both overt and covert elements of foreign Communist parties collect information and pass it through MVD channels to the Central Committee, which is the primary customer for all important intelligence reports.

This new streamlining of contacts makes detection of Communist agents extremely difficult. The prime interest in exploitation is no longer intelligence to be forwarded to the Army, Navy or Air Force, but information to be forwarded to the policy makers, the Central Committee. Thus a Communist Party member or sympathizer in a policy control position will be contacted only by MVD experts and the chances are he will not be asked to furnish documents, but only to influence policy in favor of Communist policy.

Conclusion

The Soviet press and radio give the general policy line to be followed by the foreign Communist parties; specific tactical direction is given through MVD liaison channels. In addition, foreign Communist Party members are briefed when they visit Moscow. Others are trained in special schools, but all control, whatever the channel, emanates from

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

International front organizations are envisaged primarily as a means of educating the non-Party masses abroad. These organizations are rarely exploited as Soviet intelligence organs. Individuals belonging to these fronts are rarely recruited because their identification with the movements do not give them access to worthwhile targets. The MVD does not mix into foreign political matters; its job is to inform the Soviet Government, not to execute policy. Execution of policy is left to the Central Committee.

II

USSR Control over the Satellite Countries

Soviet control of the Satellites is based on the Soviet armed forces stationed in Eastern Europe, on the MVD, on Soviet diplomatic, economic and military missions in each Satellite and is exercised through the Satellite Communist parties and governments.

The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, through links established during training or other prior relationships, controls members of the central committees of the Communist parties in the Satellite states. Top party leaders in the various Satellites who have been trained in Moscow are, for all practical purposes, Soviet men or women, and are completely subservient to Moscow.

Some control over official activities in the Satellite countries is exercised through the local embassies of the USSR. The Soviet ambassadors are in some cases considered direct representatives of the Central Committee and deliver instructions and other guidance to local Communist leaders. This channel is used for the transmittal of bulky printed materials. Personnel of the Soviet representations abroad carefully

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study the local scene in the Satellite country to which they are assigned and submit reports to Moscow.

Soviet military advisors are posted to the general staffs of all Satellite countries and therefore are familiar with the nations' war plans, report all details to Moscow.

MVD representatives are assigned by Moscow to the Satellite countries, work closely with the local security and intelligence services, and are thus aware of all current trends and popular attitudes within the country. MVD personnel submit reports on their activities to the MVD headquarters in Moscow. MVD representatives advise the local services in both positive intelligence and counter-intelligence matters. Joint activities are undertaken against third countries, especially the United States. The target of all such activities is ultimately the United States, and the USSR enlists the collaboration of Soviet Bloc embassies or legations in support of this effort. (See annex on Soviet World-Wide Espionage.) In some instances, the latter channel is more effective as a working base than the Soviet Embassy itself.

Not only are all details of military and security matters concerning the Satellites known to the USSR, but also all aspects of the political, economic, and social life in those states are directly or indirectly under the control of the USSR. Although Moscow permits and encourages programs of cultural, economic and technical collaboration among the Satellites, the Soviet control system is designed to bind the Satellites individually to the USSR rather than to one another.

TAB

EAST-WEST TRADE

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I

Past and Present

Western Europe

Before the war the Soviet Union accounted for less than one per cent of world trade, and the countries that are now its satellites accounted for another six per cent. For Western Europe, however, trade with the nations that now make up the Soviet bloc was more important than these figures indicate. Over ten per cent of Western Europe's total imports came from the bloc, and for a few commodities. Russia and the East European countries were a very important source of supply indeed. This region furnished Western Europe with nearly twenty per cent of its imports of grain, some fifteen per cent of its coal and over twenty-five per cent of its timber.

If these supplies were valuable to Western Europe in normal times, they were a matter of the utmost urgency in the hungry, dollar-short years that followed the war. When in 1948, the West Europeans came to chart the path to recovery and to calculate how they might, in the five years allotted by the Marshall Plan, free themselves of dependence on American aid, one of their central assumptions was that Russia and Eastern Europe would resume their exports on something like the pre-war scale.

They were completely disappointed. The accompanying table shows how feeble has been the performance of the East as a supplier

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in the post-war years. By the middle of 1953, and long after wartime destruction had been made good, timber exports from the Soviet bloc were still a small fraction of what this area shipped to the West before the war. Its exports of coal and grain to the West were still less than half the prewar rate. Instead of supplying Western Europe with nearly twenty per cent of its requirements of grain, the bloc now provides barely ten per cent, and shipments of wheat in particular have shrunk dismally. A further peculiarity of East-West trade in grain, moreover, is that Rumania and Hungary, both large prewar exporters, have until now virtually disappeared from the grain market. It is the Soviet Union which today does the bulk of the exporting. Oil is another commodity that until recently had all but vanished from Eastern exports agreements, and now that it is once more appearing, it tends to show up not in agreements with Rumania, the biggest traditional exporter, but in those with the USSR.

Eastern Bloc Exports to Western Europe

	Hard coal (million tons)	Grain (million tons)	Sawn soft wood (million cubic meters)
Prewar average.	11.6 (1937-38)	3.9 (1934-38)	7.0 (1935-38)
Postwar maximum	12.4 (1948)	2.2 (1949-50)	2.4 (1952-53)
July 1951-June 1952 . . .	7.0	2.1	0.8
July 1952-June 1953 . . .	6.5	1.4	2.4

In addition to the difficulty of finding goods to import from the East that are both suitable and on an ample scale, Western

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countries have discovered in the Eastern bloc other defects as a supplier. Without exception, the satellite countries perennially fail to supply the quantity of goods promised under trade agreements with the result that exports from the West must be interrupted or curtailed until the Eastern country makes good its export promises or finds other means of payment.

Price is still another source of trouble. Eastern negotiators lack flexibility and in consequence fail to respond quickly to changes in price on world markets; long after the sharp decline in world coal prices, for example, Polish trade missions were demanding for their coal exports the premium that prevailed at the height of the boom. The USSR has often followed a similar course when negotiating exports of wheat and barley--a policy that leads either to outright refusal to buy on the part of the West or to a prolonged period of haggling while trade comes to a standstill. All in all, the shortcomings of the East as a supplier have been a major, if not the major, limitation on East-West trade in the postwar years.

As a market, too, the USSR and its satellites have been a disappointment to Western traders since the end of the war. A great deal has been heard about the extent to which Western embargoes have narrowed markets in the East, but less is said about the East's rejection of the many consumer goods that have always been freely available in the West.

At no time have the Western nations imposed restrictions that would prevent the East from buying a wide range of consumer

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goods in the countries on this side of the Iron Curtain. In fact, the Soviet bloc has hitherto shown very little enthusiasm for such goods. By 1950, for example, East European purchases of Western textiles were little more than a quarter of their 1938 level.

Before the war the satellites were substantial importers of Western consumer goods, but nowadays it is clear that the USSR has forced on them its own policy of holding down consumption to a bare subsistence level. Even the much heralded new deal for the inhabitants of the bloc has so far brought few changes in the general pattern of Eastern imports. Apart from sizeable purchases of butter

Soviet eyes have turned not to Western consumer goods but to the machines with which to make their own goods.

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Germany and Eastern Europe

It would be unrealistic in any review of East-West trade to ignore the position of Germany which before the war played a dominant role in the economies of the Balkan countries. Of all the goods that Western Europe exported to the East in 1938, one-third came from Germany. In the period 1930-37 Germany sent eight and a half per cent of its total exports to the satellite countries, and another six per cent to the

Soviet Union. Germany's most important exports, in value, to the East were machinery, iron and steel manufactures, chemicals and electrical products; and in some of these categories the East often bought as much as twenty per cent of Germany's total exports.

The war and the policy that the USSR has since pursued have radically altered this relationship. Until 1950 West German exports to the Eastern bloc were scarcely worth mentioning. In that year they reached twenty-five per cent of their prewar volume but in subsequent years they again fell. Even the new German-Rumanian trade agreement, one of the first fruits of the Kremlin's new enthusiasm for East-West trade, aims to restore trade between the two countries to a mere quarter of the 1938 level.

The truth is that so long as Russia dominates the satellite countries, the Eastern markets, as Germany knew them before the war, have vanished. Germany's prewar prominence in these markets was based in part on the continuous presence of its commercial representatives and in part on the complementary nature of the two economies. In both respects Germany has now been displaced by Russia. German commercial hegemony has given way to Russian bonds that seem unbreakable; not only in the personnel of many of the key industries appointed from Moscow, but also the industrial development of each satellite is being shaped to support the needs and policies of the Soviet Union.

Nowhere is this process more striking than in Eastern Germany. What was once an integral part of the German economy has become an appendage of the Soviet economy, a unit in which heavy industry is

being developed so rapidly that it will shortly act more as a competitor than as a complement to Western Germany. Even if tomorrow all trade barriers between the two halves of Germany were to be abolished, it would be found that the old channels and the old bases of exchange had been destroyed. At the present time Eastern Germany hardly manages to fulfill its side of the very small trade agreement with the West Germans; its deliveries are perpetually in arrears which means that trade is, in fact, sustained only by what amounts to the extension of credits from the Western partners.

Indeed, the payments problem is the crucial factor in West German commercial relations with the East. Traditionally, the Eastern countries paid for German goods in food and raw materials, products that are now scarce within the Soviet bloc and a glut on the market in the West. Already the Federal Republic has more than it can do to absorb the wheat and other primary products with which such countries as Turkey and Argentina strive to pay off their debts to German exporters.

Some of Germany's industrialists may look wistfully to the East for export markets, but if the bloc cannot pay in commodities, then the question of German credits is bound to arise. Even the generous grant of credits, however, does not inevitably ensure a smooth path for East-West trade, as can be seen by looking at experience in the postwar years.

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to suspend all further shipments of iron ore until the Czechs made a serious effort to settle their bills.

Poland has shown a similar inability to compete on commercial terms. Its procrastination during price discussions has time and again forced

[] to look elsewhere for coal supplies, with the result that

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[] imports of Polish coal dropped sharply from 4 million tons in 1948 to 1.4 million in 1953.

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II

The Economy of the Soviet Bloc

In 1938 Soviet foreign trade amounted to only one per cent of the world's total. However, the countries that the USSR absorbed during and after the war, or has since come to dominate (the Baltic states, Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria) were

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more active traders and in 1938 accounted for nearly six per cent of the world's trade.

As soon as Stalin had consolidated his position the Russian state began to work unceasingly towards the goal of self-sufficiency, and from the early 'thirties onwards it withdrew further and further from participation in world trade. For the Communist planners, foreign trade has always been essentially a political instrument, to be used only in so far and for so long as it helps the attainment of the prime objectives of Soviet policy--to create a completely independent Socialist economy, indestructible in war and insulated from capitalist crisis in peace.

In a relatively poor country such as the Soviet Union was before the war, rapid and forced industrialization seemed the most obvious route to self-sufficiency. In the eyes of the Kremlin, the development of industry, particularly heavy industry, had two further advantages. It served as a basis for an armaments industry as big as any in the world; it also conformed with a political conviction that lies at the heart of Marxist philosophy: for enduring success a Communist revolution must rest on a vast industrial proletariat.

The inevitable corollaries to this policy are that the urban and rural bourgeoisie must be eliminated and the peasant herded into collective farms in the hope that his numbers may be reduced, the fruits of his labor harvested more easily by the State and that eventually he may be transformed into a kind of rural proletariat. Since the end of the war the USSR has progressively thrust these same policies on

the nearby satellite states and is now fast remolding them in the image of the Russian economy.

The consequences of these two policies--the pursuit of self-sufficiency and the overwhelming emphasis on heavy industry--have been calamitous for East-West trade. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration is provided by the way in which Moscow has warped the traditional trading pattern of the Eastern countries under its domination.

Before the war countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary conducted less than fourteen per cent of their trade with what is now the Iron Curtain community. Within the short space of six years at least two-thirds of their total trade has been forced into Communist channels.

It often happens that while one communist leader speaks glowingly of the prospects for East-West trade, another, indifferent to the contradiction, simultaneously boasts of the massive re-direction of satellite trade and of the achievements of Comecon--the so-called Council for Mutual Economic Aid. Comecon is, in fact, a Soviet-created institution through which Moscow coordinates the international trade of all the European satellites and hence, indirectly, their economic development. Its central purpose has always been to encourage trade within the orbit at the expense of trade with the outside world.

During the past years the economies of the satellite nations have been reshaped entirely to satisfy Eastern policies and without regard for the requirements of trade with the West. Just as in Russia, economic planners throughout the Eastern countries aim single-mindedly at creating a large industrial proletariat.

From 1949 onwards all the Eastern plans have placed primary emphasis on the development of heavy industry. Each nation's painfully high level of compulsory saving is funnelled chiefly into the expansion of heavy industry, while agriculture has been more or less starved of new investment funds. On the average a mere three per cent of the national product is devoted to capital improvements for agriculture as compared with an amount at least three times as great that normally goes to industry.

From time to time changes have been introduced in the various plans of the satellite countries, but in the past they have invariably been directed at fixing even higher production targets for heavy industry, always at the expense of both light industry and agriculture. Added to this neglect there is the restiveness of the peasant, deprived of consumer goods, compelled to deliver set quotas of produce to the government and forced against his will into collectives. In the circumstances it is not surprising that the satellites cannot provide on the old scale the export surpluses of food and grain with which they used to balance their trading accounts in the West.

The USSR itself suffers from similar trouble, though perhaps not so acutely as the satellites. There is little doubt but that through its own excessive concentration on heavy industry, the Soviet Union has reduced its export surplus of such traditional products as timber and wheat.

This lopsided distribution of resources within the Soviet bloc is reflected in the foreign buying of the orbit as well as in its selling

policy abroad. Only in periods of acute and threatening shortage at home or when Western nations make their sales of machinery conditional on the purchase of consumer goods, do members of the bloc part with foreign exchange for the products of Western consumer industries. For the most part their reserves of foreign exchange are spent exclusively on those items that will fill the gaps in their own heavy industry or will serve to maintain it--machinery, ships, metals and raw materials.

Still another limitation that Communist policy has imposed on East-West trade, and one that is inherent in the Soviet system, is the State monopoly of foreign trade which goes hand in hand with State planning of the entire economy. This means that responsibility lies mainly with state officials who fear to make mistakes, indeed dare not make mistakes, and who consequently prefer the safety of rigidity to the uncertainties of expansion and enterprise. Like armchair generals they are often preoccupied with the commodities and prices of last year rather than with those of the present, let alone the future.

At least one group of British importers is familiar with the Russian official who came to this country eager to sell plywood. The price he asked was more than double that ruling on world markets. When met with incredulity, he explained that these particular supplies had been manufactured during the war and hence, as the British traders must know, were very expensive. The price could not be altered without upsetting his accounts--and his career.

Consumer Goods

If the resources of the Soviet bloc are re-directed on any substantial scale to the production of food and consumer goods, then the tempo of industrialization and the armaments program must be slowed down. If non-Communist resources are to work the miracle—that is, if Communism is to be saved by capitalism—then the Russians must participate in international trade to a degree never contemplated in their autarchic plans. This would mean that the Soviet Union would have to accept, as it did in the 'twenties, the status of a backward area and apply for credits and grants from the 'bankrupt' capitalist world. For Russia's own export trades, such as food and timber, are also its neglected consumer industries.

Much of the Russian excitement over raising consumer standards is primarily propaganda and only the smallest of marginal improvements are intended in standards of living behind the Iron Curtain. The likelihood is that Communist leaders will hold grimly to their industrial targets, while giving the domestic consumer no more than the minimum increase that will keep him moderately fit and moderately willing.

It is unfortunate for the Soviet Union that there should at this time be demands on its economy from still another quarter, demands that if met in full and from the Soviet bloc alone will place an enormous strain on its resources. Communist China, now in the very early stages of its own dash to industrialize, has called for fraternal help from

the USSR. If help is refused there is the danger that China will be compelled to look elsewhere--to Japan, Germany, Britain and even to the United States.

Chinese requirements are no doubt immense, but failure on the part of the Soviet Union to deliver the goods could have disastrous consequences for Russian policy. It would be a mammoth demonstration to the Asiatic world that more than thirty-five years after its own revolution, the Communist pioneer was still unable to produce industrial goods on a scale sufficient to help its less developed allies. In its disappointment China might well drift out of the Communist bloc and the Communist movement would lose much of its magic for the populations of Southeast Asia. The desire to bind China closely to the Soviet bloc must lend urgency to Russia's need for Western industrial goods. In so far as the West provides them, it helps to sustain the Sino-Soviet partnership.

III

Soviet Propaganda, Performance, and Aims

Fundamentally, the attitude of the USSR towards trade with the West has not varied one jot in postwar years from the view it took in the 'thirties. Its policy is not concerned with the normal motives that underlie international trade--that is to say, the effort to secure some division of labor, with each country specializing in those commodities which it can produce most efficiently.

Bluntly, Russian interest in East-West trade has only two objectives: the first is to secure from the West the materials

it still lacks to maintain and expand the armaments and heavy industry of the Soviet orbit; the second aim is to sow dissension between the members of the Western alliance. The alleged benefits of East-West trade are exploited in an endeavor on the one hand to create friction between the Western nations, and on the other hand, to set Western businessmen against their governments.

From time to time the marginal interest of the Kremlin in East-West trade has shifted in accordance with its own internal plans. Roughly four stages can be distinguished in the trading behavior of the bloc since the end of the war.

Throughout the immediate postwar period genuine two-way trade was at low ebb because of wartime devastation in all parts of Europe. During this interval the USSR, though briefly and grudgingly, accepted aid from UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) and so, with greater enthusiasm, did the countries of Eastern Europe. The latter also held out eager hands for subsequent loans from the US Export-Import Bank. This stage came to an abrupt end when, as a result of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and mounting evidence in other directions that the Soviet Union intended to tighten its grip on the whole of Eastern Europe, the cold war began in earnest.

The second stage coincided with the West's initial ban on the export of strategic goods to the Eastern bloc and with unmistakable signs that the USSR had put into practice a more severe embargo policy of its own. To augment the supplies that they received legally

through such trade agreements as those with [] the Communists at this point set about organizing illicit trade channels designed to evade Western export controls. By this means they sought to acquire, regardless of cost, the materials they needed for their heavy industrial program: copper, machine tools, alloy metals, and so on.

Propaganda was used, though not on a very large scale, to support this very realistic drive. The more dependable incentive employed by the Russian and satellite traders was the monetary one--huge profits were available for the Western business man, the intermediary, the smuggler or the financier who chose to break the laws of his country. To obtain strategic materials, the Communists and their Western accomplices resorted to such devices as forging documents to mask the true destination and nature of goods, shunting cargoes from one free port to another until they could be slipped through the Iron Curtain, and establishing business concerns in the West--ostensibly reputable but in fact run by servants of the Communist Party.

These dramatic--even melodramatic--practices have never really solved Moscow's problem. They are risky, expensive and increasingly ineffective as the West progressively eliminates the loopholes. It no doubt grew obvious to the Kremlin that only unfettered, legal trade could provide the heavy industry of the bloc with key materials in sufficient quantity and at reasonable prices. Moreover, there was also the hope that once the initial rearmament boom had slackened in

the West, supplies would become easier and markets more competitive in the capitalist world. Stirred by these prospects the Communist world joined to its underground trade program an energetic propaganda drive.

The third phase in Moscow's policy towards East-West trade, was inaugurated during 1951 with a gigantic propaganda campaign that culminated in the Moscow Economic Conference of April, 1952, to which business men and academic economists from all over the world were invited. To this gathering Communist officials offered the traditional carrot held out ever since the great depression --the Eastern market is insatiable; there is no limit to the goods it can absorb and thus no limit to the relief it affords, both for capitalist unemployment and for competition between capitalist states.

To the British business man Communist spokesmen pointed out the advantage of having German and Japanese energies sidetracked into the development of Eastern markets. For the Germans and the Japanese there were tempting reminders of their historic association with Eastern markets and their added value now that British and American 'imperialists' were squeezing them out of colonial markets.

The underdeveloped areas of the world were not neglected either; they were told that not only could the Communist bloc absorb all their surplus supplies of raw materials but also it would in return provide them with machinery, 'unimperialist' technical advice, and perhaps even with credits. Throughout the Conference, the keynote

was that but for American hectoring., Western export controls would disappear and East-West trade would automatically burgeon.

Before the eyes of the delegates, the Russians dangled the famous 'Nesterov' figures. Nesterov was the official organizer of the Conference and the man whose task it usually is to welcome and woo Westerners on these occasions. His figures gave totals for the volume of East-West trade which the Russians claimed could be achieved provided the West abolished its export controls. These totals were presented in such a way as to leave the assembled guests with a dazzling impression of the possibilities of East-West trade. The outside world's trade with the Soviet bloc amounted to \$2,400 million (imports plus exports) in 1951; according to M. Nesterov, this trade could be increased in 1953 to about \$5,700 million.

It was not quite clear precisely how Moscow intended to divide its benefactions as between the various capitalis countries;

was singled out as the probable recipient of at least \$200 million's worth of orders per annum, while Western Europe as a whole was told it might expect orders worth \$1,000 million over a period of three years. The backward areas were even more favored--they could expect orders for at least another \$2-3,000 million over the same three year period. Representatives from Communist China also expressed keen interest in Western goods and implied that a fifty per cent increase over the 1951 level of trade would be welcome.

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There seemed no limit to the goods that the Russians and their satellites were ready to order. British visitors, for example, were convinced that the Soviet Union was prepared instantly to place enormous orders for British textiles.

The returning business men were particularly elated by the fact that none of these commodities came even remotely within the Western embargo lists, and orders for such consumer goods automatically earned the approval of Western government officials.

A number of British delegates hurried home full of optimistic expectations and set to work. Month after month went by and the orders still hung fire--with one exception: an order from the Chinese for \$8.4 million's worth of British wool tops.

Experience among delegates from other countries was almost identical. When it came to the point, Communist orders for consumer goods melted away leaving a hard core of strategic goods, apparently the sole commodities in which the East was genuinely interested. Not only did the East fail to expand its trade with the outside world, but from April 1952, when the Conference was held, its trade actually declined and continued to do so until by the end of 1953 it had reached its lowest point since the lean years of 1946-47.

Meanwhile, Western statisticians and economists busied themselves with an examination of the 'Nesterov' figures. When they had fought their way through the mist of inflated ruble values, generalizations about percentage increases and duplicate offers, the experts found that the Nesterov program, even if the orders had been hard, implied a volume of East-West trade smaller

than the prewar level--in some cases as much as fifty per cent less than in 1938. So far as increased trade was concerned, therefore, the Moscow Economic Conference was a fiasco. The Western business men who had rushed off to Moscow wound up with pleasant memories of the Russian ballet, and empty order books, while the Russians failed to loosen the strategic embargo.

But from the Kremlin's point of view the Conference was all the same a highly satisfactory charade. The average newspaper reader in the West, glancing through the headlines, grew accustomed to the notion that vast Soviet trade orders were there for the asking. Certain business men were so bemused that they blamed their own governments for depriving them of Eastern orders. Some were even induced to join organizations sponsored by the Communist Party with the object of agitating for the relaxation of export controls.

One such organization, whose roots can be traced directly to the Conference, is the British Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Mr. Eden, the British Prime Minister, described this body as 'A Communist front organization...mainly concerned with the dissemination of Communist propaganda'.

It is ironic that Moscow now refuses to have any overt dealings with this particular group, for once such bodies have accomplished their propaganda mission and have been discredited for their pains, the Russians wash their hands of them, preferring to act through more respectable channels.

The essential dishonesty of the Conference became crystal clear when it was learned in the autumn of the same year that Stalin himself had published almost simultaneously a treatise on economics in which he wrote off the future of East-West trade as it is understood in the West. Stalin pointed out that the world is now divided into 'two parallel world markets'—one, the Communist bloc, has been created under the leadership of Russia and this leadership has been so effective that Communist countries will soon have no need of imports from the capitalist countries.

'But the fundamental thing, of course, is not the economic blockade (the Western embargo), but the fact that since the war these countries (the Soviet bloc) have joined together economically and established economic cooperation and mutual assistance.The result is a fast pace of industrial development in these countries. It may be confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development, it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist countries, but will themselves feel the necessity of finding an outside market for their surplus products.'

The fourth phase of the Soviet Union's postwar concern with East-West trade opened in August of 1953 and coincided with M. Malenkov's admission that the masses behind the Iron Curtain needed greater material encouragement in the form of more food and consumer goods.

There are, of course, no barriers of Western construction that prevent the Communists from buying any consumer goods that they can pay for. However, the fact is that they did not rush to buy women's hosiery, refrigerators and automobiles. Only a few--a very few--consumer goods were acquired from the West. The Russians made two or three spectacular purchases of butter, they bought oranges, paper, bottling machinery, and some silk piece goods; but for the most part they sought instead the machines with which to turn out their own consumer goods.

The fifth and latest phase in the development of East-West trade appeared with the eclipse of Malenkov in February 1955. With a return to major emphasis upon the development of basic industry, the Malenkov thesis of an increase in the availability of consumer goods has been dropped. With this change the Soviet record in East-West trade which was so poor in absolute terms and so far from the promise of 1953, shows indications of becoming even poorer. Although the banner of increased trade will continue to be waved by the USSR, the governing consideration will continue to be that of Soviet policy, the most recent change in which would seem to preclude any great rise in actual East-West trade.

Undoubtedly there was a greater element of reality in these Soviet approaches. They acknowledged their need for Western goods more openly and they showed greater zeal in scraping together exports that the West might be persuaded to buy. Russia produced some surprising shipments of pig iron and substantially increased its exports of oil. Rumania also came into the market with its first sizeable offer of wheat since the war. But it was obvious that there existed in the East an acute shortage of exportable goods and thus as a last resort the Soviet Union was compelled to sell gold, platinum and silver--altogether over \$140 million's worth in the last six months of 1953.

It can be taken for granted that if the industry and agriculture of the Soviet bloc could produce an exportable surplus, then East-West trade might have expanded at least in the short run and at

least to its prewar dimensions. But any conceivable expansion was bound to fall far short of the grandiose proportions claimed in Moscow's most recent propaganda drive.

In a series of moves initiated by the USSR towards the end of 1953, a stream of Western business men--French, British and German--travelled to Moscow to fill their order books. The British delegation were wined and dined and shown the sights. Meanwhile the Moscow Press and radio made great play of a 'kabanov figure'--a declaration of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade that the Soviet Union could place orders to the value of \$1,120 million in Britain over three years.

When the delegates got down to brass tacks, however, they failed to find a new Eldorado. More than half the items requested by the Russians were clearly of strategic importance, and the prices they offered often took no account of the rise in values since early 1950. Simultaneously it became clear that the Soviet negotiators were window-shopping from country to country throughout Western Europe, aiming to play off one starry-eyed capitalist against another. The

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assuming that the figure of \$1,120 million was fact and not oratory, claimed for themselves a similar freedom to provide Russia with strategic goods. At the same time it was made obvious to French trade negotiators in Moscow that M. Bidault's loyalty to his Western Allies in Berlin seriously jeopardized their chances of doing business with the East.

IV

The China Trade

The prewar pattern of trade with China will never return. In the 'thirties, China's most important trading partners were first, Hong Kong, acting as an entrepot for other Asian powers and second, Japan followed closely by the United States. For most of the nations in the West, China was not a very important market--Britain, for example, sent less than one per cent of its total exports to China before the war, Germany slightly over two per cent. However, as a source for certain specialized products--liquid eggs, soya beans, bristles, raw silk and tung oil--China did have considerable importance for Western countries.

Hong Kong owed its supremacy in the China trade to its role as banker and merchant, functions which it still performs but on a greatly diminished scale. There can be little doubt but that the long-term aim of the Chinese Communists--they have said so quite plainly--is to eliminate even the present degree of dependence on the services provided by Hong Kong. It will be tolerated only so long as it is useful to the Communist regime--economically as a channel for Western goods that cannot be obtained from the Soviet orbit and politically as a hostage

which, it is hoped, may secure British forbearance toward the new China's foreign policy.

The traditional trade connections between Japan and China rested in part on the complementary nature of the two economies; China, a vast and primarily agricultural country seemed to provide a natural market for a highly industrialized community such as Japan with a huge and growing population confined to a few small islands. China imported Japanese textiles and similar cheap mass consumer goods and in return it furnished Japan with such raw materials as coal and iron ore. At the same time Japan's puppet state Manchukuo in North China was being rapidly developed by its new masters and absorbed an increasing volume of machinery and transport equipment.

When today Japanese business men speak longingly of the Chinese market, they have in mind a client whose role in the Japanese economy was very similar to that played by the Balkans in prewar Germany. In each area there was a degree of political and commercial penetration that converted both the Balkans and China into something that resembled captive markets. Nowadays it is the Soviet Union which occupies this commanding position.

As soon as the Chinese Communists came to power they set in motion a series of economic and political policies which have inevitably transformed China's trade relations with the outside world. As rapidly as possible they eliminated private business--Western business men, in particular, were harshly dealt with, and the regime ostentatiously broke many of the long-standing ties between China and Western commerce.

It has plundered Western firms with a ruthlessness matched only by Nazi behavior when blackmailing would-be Jewish refugees.

Those firms which have escaped with confiscation may consider themselves fortunate, for others are compelled by threats of all kinds to remain, so that the new regime may exploit them still further. Their chief value to Communist China is as a source of foreign exchange which they are obliged to import and hand over on a variety of pretexts--in the form of a premium payment required before a foreign employee is permitted to leave China, or in order to pay the wages of swollen staff which they are forced to keep on the payroll long after the State has denied the firm the right to engage in any remunerative work.

The Communists were hardly in the saddle before they set on foot plans to expand Chinese industry, particularly heavy industry. In part this was done in the interest of self-sufficiency. Of equal importance, however, was the goal of creating an industrial proletariat on the Soviet model; the new regime was fashioned originally by peasants and intellectuals, an improper procedure by the light of Marxist orthodoxy, which postulates that the industrial proletariat shall be the vanguard of Communist revolutions. Still a third characteristic of post-Communist China has been its preoccupation with building and equipping a powerful military apparatus both to support its intervention in Korea and to aid insurgent movements, such as the Vietminh in Southeast Asia.

Certain consequences have flowed inexorably from these new policies. China turned to the USSR for armaments and then for industrial and

technical personnel; and to most of these transactions the Soviet approach has been strictly commercial. Although China is said to be receiving a substantial amount of ruble aid, there is much evidence to show that the Soviet Union is a stiff and exacting creditor. Accordingly, a large part of China's export surplus is today preempted by its ideological friends.

China's ability to buy goods from the outside world is now small. It has directed more than three-quarters of its trade towards the Soviet bloc; its own growing industry has first call on the coal and raw materials formerly exported to Japan; and old customers, discouraged by the uncertainties of trade with China, have found alternative supplies of the products it used to sell. It is estimated that without a severe cut in its exports to Russia and the European satellites, China can spare no more than \$420 million a year for purchases in the free world.

The truth is that China is turning itself into an integrated part of a Communist economic bloc that stretches from the Elbe to the China Sea. How far this process has already gone is illustrated by the fact that the central European satellites have become exporters of Chinese bristles and soya beans.

Conversely, China now exports Ceylon rubber to the Soviet Union. Symbolic of this trading pattern is the establishment in East Berlin of the Chinese Export-Import Corporation, an organization set up by the Chinese Communists as the focal point for all trade negotiations between West and China. It is undoubtedly the Communist intention that Chinese trade commissioners operating in Europe will ultimately destroy the value of Hong Kong as a point of contact and a channel for Western goods.

At the present time, then, all the basic trends of Chinese policy make for a reduction, not an expansion of East-West trade. The strategic controls imposed by the free world on exports to China have undeniably had the same effect. They are the consequence of a United Nations decision, taken in June, 1951, that China as an aggressor in Korea should be denied all outside supplies of war-potential materials. But when and if the embargo of the free world is lifted it will in all probability be found that the China trade has changed beyond recognition. China's demands from the West will be concentrated almost exclusively on the products required for the development of heavy industry. It will no longer be a market for textiles and other consumer goods; the Chinese Communists have said flatly that they are not interested in such frivolities.

Fundamentally, the position of China as a participant in East-West trade is much the same as that of Russia in the 'twenties. The ultimate goal is autarchy. To reach that goal the Chinese will be eager for Western capital goods. They will be willing to absorb steel, rolling stock and construction equipment in large quantities, but their appetite will be limited by the inability to provide enough exports in return. Only if the West is prepared to grant them large-scale credits will there be any large-scale increase in the volume of trade with China.

V

Summary and Conclusions

Trade with foreign nations is not an end in itself. Its purpose and its justification is that it makes possible a higher standard of living for all participants. This principle is an axiom that most people are ready to accept when they consider only the immediate consequences of trade. They are less willing to apply it to some of the indirect consequences.

If, for example, British exports of machinery strengthen the military power of a potential aggressor against world peace, and if the British Government is therefore compelled to increase its defense expenditure, then these exports are responsible for a fall rather than a rise in the British standard of living. In the last resort, the economics of East-West trade turn on this simple proposition.

But for those who are prepared not only to ignore this principle but also to run risks with their national security, it is high time to re-state the obvious facts involved in East-West trade.

The first of these facts has to do with the dimensions of the potential market in Communist territories. Britain and other nations that live by trade must pursue vigorously every possible opportunity. But it is one thing to act energetically and quite another to foster illusions about the potential scale of the trade in question. The Soviet bloc and China are not unlimited markets. And the limitations imposed on trade with these areas by the Communists themselves are far more permanent and far more damaging than the controls that the West has decreed for strategic reasons. Marxist rulers adhere to policies

that place self-sufficiency above all else; that, with few exceptions, exclude consumer goods from import lists; and that cripple the ability of the bloc to pay for Western goods. There will always be a handful of ingenious traders who will find some profit in trade with the East, but by and large the Communists restrictions leave little scope for exporters interested in broad-based, substantial and lasting commerce.

Second, the possibilities of East-West trade have been greatly exaggerated. Communist spokesmen have deliberately done so for propaganda reasons and out of a desire to obtain strategic goods. They have found an enthusiastic echo in the West among fellow travellers and also among wishful thinkers who regard East-West trade as a magic formula that will solve all their marketing problems. Undoubtedly trade with the East can be expanded beyond the depressed levels of the past year. There is certainly more trade to be done with the Soviet bloc and China, but not a great deal more unless the West cares to finance it.

Third, it is the Communist bloc which is in urgent need of East-West trade--not the West. It is the Communist economies which are stretched beyond their limits by the weight of inordinate ambitions. Over the coming years, the Communist bloc plans simultaneously to industrialize China and provide it with a modern and well-equipped army, to raise living standards for the masses, and to maintain in Soviet Europe the present tempo of industrialization and military expansion. By themselves the resources of the Communist world are not equal to all these tasks.

These three facts point to one conclusion: that Western credits-- or outright grants--are the key to any sizeable expansion of markets in the East.

Once East-West trade is put in this perspective, it becomes simply a matter for the nations of the free world to determine whether and on what terms to extend aid to the Communist bloc. Since in the short term credits imply for the giver a cut in the standard of living, these nations may well conclude that any initial sacrifice should be reserved for proven friends, for such peoples as the Asian partners in the Colombo Plan and such needy members of the free world as the undeveloped countries of Africa and South America. When their wants are met, the nations of the West can reasonably be asked to make further sacrifices only if credits are granted to the Communist bloc on terms that will bring long-term economic benefits to the democratic peoples--that is to say, credits should be made available on condition that there is a change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and China which will lessen the need for a heavy armaments bill in the West.

The Communist world must first give clear evidence that it has abandoned its efforts to subvert and dominate other nations, in particular by promoting so-called 'liberation movements' in Asia.

To date there has been no such evidence. So long as it is lacking, the logical course for the trading nations of the free world, if they wish to expand their commerce, is to concentrate their energies on eliminating the difficulties that hamper trade with their existing best

customers. No one has calculated the growth in trade that would result within the democratic world alone from such humdrum efforts as the shortening of delivery dates, the production of better and cheaper products and above all, the further relaxation of import quotas and tariffs.

In the long run these are the only durable solutions available for those business men who are reluctant to cater for anything less than a sellers' market and also for those who hope that competitive German and Japanese products can be deflected into Communist markets. Sooner or later they must all accept the fact that the Communist world has no abiding interest in Western products and that through trade within its own borders there still remain tremendous opportunities for raising the standard of living in the free world. All too often in recent years traders and politicians have spent a disproportionate amount of time and trouble chasing the remote, unreliable and politically suspect markets of the East.

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May 31, 1955

"PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" - SOVIET STYLE

Significance of "Peaceful Coexistence"

The Soviet use of the term "peaceful coexistence" capitalizes upon man's natural desire for peace. The contrast between Soviet pronouncements and Soviet deeds has created great confusion in the minds of men. To clarify this, it is necessary to examine Soviet policy as guided by Communist theoretical reasoning. The principle of "peaceful coexistence" is a smoke screen designed to conceal the true designs of the international Communist movement as delineated by Marx and Engels, and later by Lenin and Stalin. It is only one of the methods which the Communists have been using in a variety of tactics and which reflects a temporary shift of emphasis in their over-all strategy of fomenting world revolution.

"Peaceful coexistence" is not new in the program of the Soviet Government. Emphasis on this policy is dictated by the current position of the Soviet Union in world affairs. It also conforms with the basic ideology of Marx as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin. In order to understand the term, a basic distinction must be made between foreign policy of the USSR and the organized world international Communist movement. The former is only the tool of the latter.

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Communist Theory and Practice

Official pronouncements made by the Communist parties of the world and the Soviet Union have, in the past, raised the issue of "peaceful coexistence" as a program for world peace. Such announcements invariably raise the question among the countries of the free world of whether a change of policy is taking place or merely a temporary shift in tactics. These questions can easily be answered by examining the basic doctrines of the Soviet Communist Party. Pronouncements are propaganda, but Communist ideology is implemented as militant policy. The Soviet Communist Party, which sets these policies, regards itself as infallible. To follow Party policy is both the right and duty of the regime.

Communist theory states that the principal task of the Party is to follow world events closely, and interpret them correctly, particularly crises in various countries, in order to seize the right moment in which to launch a revolution. Theoretical Communism holds that the class struggle is inevitable, that Communist principles must be interpreted in a universal sense and that it is impossible to develop a completely Communist society until the entire world is Communist.

The Communists regard their ideological heritage as having a more dominant influence in the formulation of policy than other factors. The dictates of the Party are, therefore, more important than the decisions of the policy-making bodies created by the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. The enlargement of a policy of "peaceful coexistence" at any time, either

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by the Communist parties of the world or the Soviet Union, is no more than a tactic designed to advance the international Communist movement.

"Peaceful Coexistence" - Soviet Policy

The present emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" is the 1955 version of a theme that has been dominant in Communist propaganda since late 1947. This latter date is significant for in October 1947 the Soviet Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party established the Cominform. This act constituted, in effect, a declaration of economic and political warfare against the United States, and heralded the beginning of the "cold war". Thus, the East-West split was formally acknowledged.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the "Peace" campaign was a direct sequel to, and a consequence of, the proclamation of the "cold war". For seven years it has been in practice as an instrument of the "cold war".

The proclamation of Andrei Zhdanov at one of the early meetings of the Cominform laid down the doctrine of two camps--one headed by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States and Great Britain. This was no new doctrine, since it had been stated repeatedly by Lenin and Stalin. Zhdanov merely made it plain to that body that the universal desire of man for peace was to be perverted and exploited in an effort to persuade him to support Communist parties and Soviet policy.

Historical Development

Eugene Dennis, the American Communist, declared that "peaceful coexistence" was the "bed-rock foundation of the foreign policy of the

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Soviet State". Since the Communists continue to reiterate this, development of this policy must be considered.

During the period of March 1917 to July 1921, generally known as "the development and isolation period", the Bolsheviks seized control of the state and established the U.S.S.R. Their goal was the overthrow of all existing governments and the establishment of a global Communist state. In 1919 Moscow became the seat of the world-wide Communist Third International. One of the main principles laid down during the period was that no tactical move or policy was inconsistent with Communist principles, so long as it advances the cause of world revolution. As early as 1919, "peaceful coexistence" was one of the tactics adopted as Soviet policy.

During 1921-1932, the rapprochement period, the Soviet Union sought to establish its internal security by treaties and agreements of non-aggression, non-intervention and neutrality pacts. Moscow subscribed to international peace movements, but again the widely subversive activities of the Communist International proved governmental actions as mere tactical moves made necessary by the weakness of the Soviet State.

The period 1933-1939 was largely characterized by efforts to establish a system of collective security in the face of the expansionism of Germany and Japan. The factors regulating Soviet policy were collective security, peace, universal disarmament and the United Front. But the Communist International continued to work underground to build a world Communist society.

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The period 1939-1946 was occupied by the Soviet Union's war for survival against the Nazis. During the 1947-1955 period--that of the Cominform--the U.S.S.R. has embarked on a vast propaganda campaign for "peaceful coexistence", while at the same time engaging in subversion of Czechoslovakia, war in China, aggression in Korea, Malaya and Indochina, and continued subversive activities of the international Communist movement throughout the world.

International Communist Movement

During the entire period 1919 to date, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union covertly directed--as it continues to direct and implement--Communist basic doctrine, which never changes or vacillates. Militant groups of Soviet colonists, mostly indigenous to the country they are to subvert, are trained in Moscow. They are then returned to their native countries and actively engage in activities designed to destroy the existing forms of government and to establish piecemeal the Soviet Socialist Republics of the world. Control of the satellites is more direct and open. Party leaders in the satellites have in virtually all cases been trained in Moscow and to all intents and purposes they are Soviet citizens, completely subservient to Moscow. Army and police controls are also direct and in most cases overt.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union contains the Section for Liaison with Foreign Communist Parties. This

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is usually referred to as the Foreign Section of the Central Committee. It directs, controls and supports world-wide Communist movements. It also directs and controls Communist-"front" organizations, the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Anti-Fascist Soviet Youth Committee, the Anti-Fascist Soviet Women's Committee and the World Peace Council.

The Communists have used many and varied organizations to throw up their smoke screen of "peaceful coexistence." One of the principal and most specialized is the World Peace Council. Its campaigns are supported by all Communist "Front" organizations. From its headquarters in Vienna, the Permanent Executive Bureau, composed of 50 members (24 known Communists and 19 closely associated with the Communist Party), issues resolutions for approval by "World Peace Congresses." These Congresses adopt resolutions without question. The purpose of all resolutions is to promote the political aims of the U.S.S.R. by exploiting the universal desire for peace.

Whatever the "front" or vehicle used to promote their peace campaign, the Soviets keep tightly in their own hands the control and finances of what is often represented as a spontaneous popular movement. They assure Communist majorities on all committees and "bureaus" which issue instructions, draft resolutions and organize conferences.

Communist Party, USA - The Communist Party, USA, in its official pronouncements has put forward "peaceful coexistence" as a program for world peace. United States Communist Party leaders by their statements

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have shown that "peaceful coexistence" is a policy of the U.S. Communist Party and the Soviet Union alike. The duplicity of these statements, on the other hand, is revealed by their ideological motivation. U. S. Party leaders openly state that "the first great strength of the Communist Parties in all countries is their scientific Marxist-Leninist theory" and that "flexibility in strategy and tactics and orthodoxy in matters of principle are the Communist rule. This theory has **only** one objective-- that of turning the wheel forward until the world-wide union of Socialist Republics shall have been established."

"Peaceful Coexistence" in Asia -- The Soviet Union's executive agent for the advancement of Communism in Asia is Communist China. Peiping has repeatedly put forward as a basis of "peaceful coexistence" their "Five Principles":

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful coexistence.

These principles are merely slogans of the official Chinese Communist propaganda machine. If they are examined closely, they all mean very much the same thing and are the principles which govern normal relations between most non-Communist states, although they are not set down in

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writing. The Chinese Communist Government evidently considered that they needed to announce these slogans because their normal conduct of international relations is so blatantly abnormal.

The Chinese Communists, taking their orders from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, first issued these slogans after their aggressive annexation of Tibet in 1950. But during 1950 they were also engaged in open aggression in Korea and Indochina. This is further proof that underlying Communist doctrine and not open pronouncements govern their policies and practices.

The "Five Principles" were reasserted in a different context after the Geneva Agreement when Chou En-lai visited New Delhi and Rangoon. Again this was overt propaganda while Communist subversion continued. Mao Tze-Tung, the Chinese Communist leader, openly asserted the Communists' true principles on the 23th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China. In his dissertation, "The Dictatorship of the People's Democracy", which still governs their policies, he stated: "It is impossible to sit on the fence...no third road exists."

Mao Tze-Tung further elaborated:

"There are social sectors, there are countries which have real party politics, a democratic life, real civil liberties. In such places one adopts the Popular Front, to attract the left-wingers and the leftist groups, good or bad, sincere or not. Tempt them, each through his particular weakness, as the devil tempts. Help them to get what they want; put pressure, first with offers, later with threats. Compromise them if you can, so that they can't get away. And this every day, without respite, one after the other with as deep a psychological study of each as possible".

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Conclusion

"Peaceful coexistence" is a tactic in the strategy of International Communism. The actions which Communists must take in terms of strategy are basic and never change. Although Communist policy dictates that the basis of relations with other countries is the "coexistence" of two opposed systems, they openly admit that the purpose of this doctrine is to delay war until the Communist revolution reopens in Europe or until colonial revolutions come to a head. Until this happens, the maintenance of peaceful relations is an obligatory task.

In order to bring about these revolutions, Communists operate under the theory that it is possible to conquer the most powerful enemy by taking thorough and skillful advantage of every "fissure", however small; by using every possible means to gain an ally, even though this ally be temporary and vacillating; and by proselyting for peace they are covertly carrying out the best defense of the U.S.S.R. The Communists themselves state that "Those who do not understand this do not understand even a grain of Marxism and of scientific modern socialism in general".

Therefore, it is obvious that while espousing "peace" and "peaceful coexistence", the Communists continue a drive toward absolute mastery of the world. Their tactics are all to be found within the framework of a carefully constructed and all-embracing plan based upon Marx-Engels as interpreted by Stalin and Lenin.

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In a relatively short period of 30 years, Moscow-directed colonial imperialism has met with considerable success. It has fixed an iron grip on the millions of non-Russians within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. It has established rigid domination over the Eastern European puppet states. It has brought Communist China into its orbit. From China it has spread out to Korea, Indochina and Southeast Asia. The long arm of Communism has extended from Moscow through Prague to Latin America. In all important areas not under Communist rule it has had varying degrees of success by a subtle and powerful subversion of free governments.

As has been demonstrated to the world, Soviet-Communist leaders openly preach "peaceful coexistence", while at the same time they expound the classics of Marxism which teach that in the sphere of theory there can be no concessions. As a result, the people of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Communist China, and North Vietnam have now been incorporated into the Soviet orbit against a strident, continuous background of "Peaceful Coexistence - Soviet Style".

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EAST GERMANY---A SOVIET COLONY

The Soviet High Commission (formerly Soviet Control Commission) has over 3,000 Russian officials scattered throughout East Germany in every key unit of government, political activity, transportation and business. It has agents in all important industrial plants in East Germany.

The Military Department of the Soviet High Commission under Soviet army officers controls the East German armed forces, i.e., the Alert Police (Bereitschaften), the Maritime Police (Seepolizei), and the Air Police (Luftpolizei).

Ministries of the USSR issue instructions to East Germany industrial and trading organizations.

The "Socialist Unity Party" (SED) is a facade behind which the Communist Party operates to control the other parties which are forced to participate.

The Political Affairs Administration of the Soviet High Commission issues detailed confidential instructions to all levels of the Socialist Unity Party. Some political subjects are reserved to the Soviet organ exclusively.

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EAST GERMAN MILITARISM - SOVIET INSPIRED

The illegal remilitarization of East Germany has now proceeded to the point that the Garrisoned People's Police (Kasernierte Volkspolizei, or KVP, the East German "Army") has seven combat divisions. There are two corps, each containing one mechanized and two rifle divisions, and an independent mechanized division which may serve as the nucleus for a third corps similar to the two now extant. The KVP is steadily developing into a force capable of participating in limited combat operations. Small naval and air elements have also been developed.

In order to give a semblance of credulity to the fiction that East Germany has no armed forces, the Minister of Interior, rather than a defense minister, has charge of the "police" forces. Under him, a Deputy Minister of Interior heads the Main Administration for the Garrisoned People's Police (Hauptverwaltung für die Kasernierte Volkspolizei (HVKVP) and performs all the functions of a minister of defense. A Deputy Chief and Chief of Staff of the HVKVP supervises planning and staff work, while three deputy chiefs of staff directly command the ground, sea, and air forces.

KVP divisions are organized along Soviet lines but are not yet completely identical with Soviet rifle and mechanized divisions. The KVP is supplied with Soviet weapons and equipment, employs Soviet tactical doctrine in its training, has Soviet-type uniforms, and is completely Soviet-controlled. The role of the KVP in any combat operation will be determined, not by Germans, but by the Soviets.

The planning of international Communism visualized a "Free Germany based on Communism" in the early 1920's. The Communists' present policies are only an interim implementation of steps toward this ultimate goal.

B. Anticipated Formation of East German Army by Soviet Utilization of German Prisoners of War

The Soviets' long-range plan for a "Free Germany based on Communism" was a part of their over-all strategy looking toward world domination. When German soldiers first fell into their hands in 1941, these captives became important pawns in the game. They were to be exploited and manipulated to further Soviet imperialism. As a result, the prisoners' legal rights under the rules of warfare as set forth by the Hague and subsequent Geneva Conventions were largely disregarded by the Soviets. True to their concept of war as a total struggle in which no aspect of life is immune, they initiated a practice in which every prisoner was denied the right to remain a neutral, to return to his homeland, or to pursue any policy contrary to that of the USSR.

The above plan embraced not only the German PW's, but also those of Japanese and other nationalities captured in World War II. More recently it was applied to POWs taken by Communist armies such as the Vietminh in Indochina and it can be seen in the North Korean and Chinese Communist utilization of prisoners in Korea. The insidious plot is standard, often effective, and planned to further the ultimate Communist goal of world domination.

Following their avowed maxim that the end justifies the means, the Soviets, in the early stages of World War II, began to lay their plans for the domination of Germany. The prisoners were a very important segment of this well-planned scheme. Early in the game, the Soviets organized

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the "antifa" committees in Germany and among the German POWs in their hands.

These committees were on a low level. The next step was the establishment of a National Committee for Free Germany (NKFD) which was composed of officers and selected NCOs. Next came the German Officers Association (BDO), composed of selected German Generals and officers. This was eventually to be used to help firmly establish and support the East German regime and East German Police under the authority of such veteran Soviet-German Communists as Walter Ulbricht, Erich Weinert, Otto Grotewohl, Wilhelm Pieck and Mrs. Rubiner. Such prominent personalities in this group as Generals von Seydlitz, von Daniels, and Graf von Hulsen, still held in Moscow, may one day be used as political trumps, depending on the turn of events in East Germany. Field Marshal Paulus, captured at Stalingrad, was returned to East Germany. Field Marshal Paulus, captured at Stalingrad, was returned to East Germany in late autumn 1953.

Soviet tactics of utilizing and exploiting POWs evolved in the early stages of World War II. The implementation of this Soviet POW plan helped in the establishment and strengthening of the now Communist-dominated state subservient to the USSR. This typical Soviet policy was a unilateral action, which serves Moscow's purposes and completely disregards agreements on post-war Germany made by the USSR with its fighting allies at Yalta and elsewhere.

The POW organizations by which the Soviets sought to consolidate control of Germany are as follows:

1. "Antifa".

When Nazi power was waning, the Communists began organizing "Antifa" units among prisoners held in the USSR. In the POW camps in the USSR, evening courses as well as full-time schools conducted regular training

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in order to induce these trainees to return home and cooperate with native Communists. Until repatriated, graduates of these "anti-fascist" schools frequently held supervisory jobs in the camps. The "Antifa" units were also active in Germany. The history of these organizations indicates that the Soviets planned an integrated function for them.

2. The National Committee for Free Germany.

This Committee was formed in 1943 under the pretext that it was to be used only for propaganda purposes. When the Western Allies became alarmed that this group might develop into a Communist-dominated German Government in exile, the Soviets hastily assured the Allies that it was purely a propaganda scheme to weaken the German Army and Nazi State. The later assignments of the POW component groups clearly portray the true aim of this committee. The membership of the Committee consisted of:

a. A group of 45 selected German officers, many of whom presently hold positions in the East German Police, Government, and military establishment.

b. German civilian Communists in the Soviet Union such as Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck. Some of these people now hold high positions in the East German Government.

c. German Generals whose names were useful for propaganda in Germany, such as von Seydlitz and Paulus. The Soviets miscalculated upon the importance of names and this group was later dissolved.

Expert Soviet psychologists were used to influence this organization. Daily meetings were held and it was made to appear that this was a group of unquestionable patriots working together to save the Reich. The oldtime German Communists maintained control throughout the existence of the Free Germany Committee.

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3. German Officers' Association.

This was founded shortly after the initiation of the National Committee for Free Germany. This was the instrument by means of which a closer and more personal contact could be established with internees of other camps. From this organization came camp and front line emissaries. The latter carried on propaganda among German front line units, and the former were assigned to various camps for work in accordance with the organization's policies. The Soviets hinted to these groups that, as a reward for cooperation, they would be given influential positions in the future German State. At Lunovo another group of Generals under the supervision of Mrs. Rubiner prepared textbooks for German schools. In this way Communist instruction material was produced for utilization in Germany during the postwar period - a field in which the Soviets anticipated the Western powers, although without much success.

4. Activists.

After the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the Soviets discarded their pretense of utilizing and training prisoners for propaganda reasons and replaced all the emissaries of the German Officers' Association with so-called political activists who were staunch Communists. Germans who belonged to the Communist Party prior to 1933 and members of the former Communist Youth Movement came to the fore. The camp "Aktivs" completely dominated the inmates of the POW camps. At this point, Communist "education" or indoctrination became intense.

With the end of hostilities, the National Committee for Free Germany and the German Officers' Association disintegrated, since the political elite of Ulbricht, Pieck, etc., had been dispatched to East Germany. In

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November 1945 the two organizations were formally dissolved in a ceremony in Moscow in which von Seydlitz and Weinert signed the protocol.

In 1948, forty-one German officers were selected to attend a special Antifa school at Krasnogorsk and this group was designated as Section III. Sections I and II were training propagandists and journalists. Section III was a final training school in which Communist doctrine was re-emphasized to a special group of students to be repatriated. From this group emerged such men as Lt. Gen. Vincenz Mueller, Major General Hans Wulz, and Col. Wilhelm Adam, all of whom now hold high positions in the East German military forces (KVP).

When the "People's Police" (Volkspolizei) was founded in the Soviet zone of Germany on June 1st, 1945, it was generally assumed that this was to become a force safeguarding law and order after the end-of-the-war chaos. Few people suspected at the time that it would become the core of a military force shaped after the Soviet army, serving the purposes of Bolshevism and ready to spring into action whenever its initiators required.

The KVP-system, which costs the East German taxpayers five thousand million marks a year (one-sixth of the Soviet zonal budget) has approximately 125,000 to 130,000 troops under its command, in addition to the regular and border police.

The fact that such troops exist and are steadily being improved, is one reason for giving serious consideration to the problem of German reunification along democratic lines.

TAB

"FREE" GERMAN ELECTIONS -- COMMUNIST STYLE

Though obligated by the Potsdam Agreement to promote democracy in the zone of Germany occupied by them, the Soviets have violated the Agreement flagrantly to conceal Communist weakness. Behind a smokescreen of confusion the Russians have forced non-Communist parties into a "coalition" dominated by Communists. Party leaders who opposed the union either fled to the West or stayed to be kidnapped and murdered. Craven leaders surrendered to Communist dictatorship.

The [REDACTED] coalition was launched publicly at a convention in Berlin, in April 1946, as the "German Socialist Unity Party" (SED). From the outset all power was concentrated in Moscow-trained agents. Receiving daily instructions from the Russians, the Communist dictators organized a system on the model of the USSR. Communists were placed in control of every strategic office in East Germany.

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To make their puppet government appear "legitimate," the Soviets organized an "election" for a new parliament in East Germany on October 15, 1950. The Communist Party was ordered to win this "election" by whatever means, including force, fraud and deception. When the results of the alleged vote were published, the National Front (the Communist ticket) claimed to have received 99.7 per cent of all votes, with more than 98 per cent of eligible voters participating. Such numbers are so obviously fabricated that they were considered ridiculous by everyone.

- 2 -

Public counting of the votes was forbidden because in the previous "election" of May 1949 the Communists had been embarrassed by thousands of negative ballots, many of them carrying insulting remarks. Party workers were ordered to explain to all voters that any voter who was absent from the polls on election day would be considered an enemy of peace and unity and subject to deportation to a slave labor camp. Communist leaders rounded up populations of whole villages and marched them to the polls, allowing none to escape.

The ballot was "secret", according to the Communist meaning of the word. Only one list of candidates was printed on the ballots, and no mark was necessary to vote the straight ticket. Although there were a few booths where a voter could mark his ballot secretly, radio announcements made it clear that anyone who went into a booth was marking himself an "enemy of peace". Communist spies were present at all polling places to take down the names of "enemies", who were subsequently thrown into slave labor camps.

Communist stooges were put on the radio to testify that the "election" had been by free and secret ballot. Since the counting (if there was any in fact) was conducted in offices of the Central Government by Communists under direct Russian supervision, no reliable information is available as to how many East Germans risked their lives to write objections on their ballots. Moscow radio congratulated the East Germans for their successful "election", even though every principle of an honest ballot had been cynically violated under the personal direction of Soviet officials.

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TAB

SLAVE LABOR IN EAST GERMAN URANIUM MINES

The Wismuth Aktiengesellschaft (Bismuth Co., Ltd.) is the secret Soviet trust that runs the uranium mines in Eastern Germany. A state within a state, it has its own laws, supply and transportation, housing, health and social services--and police. The Western world, and even most East Zone Germans, have known almost nothing of what goes on behind its barbed-wire boundaries. Last week the British Control Commission in Berlin issued a 5,000-word report, compiled by British Intelligence, that unwrapped the details of Russia's "frantic drive" for the raw material of the atom bomb:

Some 300,000 German men and women are virtual slave laborers in the mines. The women, who are known as "Erzengel" (a punning word that means both "arch-angel" and angel of the ore), lay track and push ore carts underground. Drillers often work hip-deep in water. Many contract silicosis from the dust, or cancer of the lungs from the radioactive ore. Few last more than one year underground. Workers lose their regular identity cards and if found outside the mine area are returned in handcuffs.

The miners' boss is a Major General Malzev, with headquarters at Siegmars-Schoenau in Saxony. His organization also includes 15,000 German administrative workers, 5,000 Soviet soldiers and MVD (secret police) agents, and special German police units.

Mining started at Johanngeorgenstadt near the Czech frontier in 1946, but has now spread to more than 230 communities in the Erzgebirge, Vogtland, Goerlitz district, Thuringian Forest, and Harz Mountains. Farms and forests are devastated, and whole towns are evacuated to make room for workers. As many as 40 girls and women

- 2 -

share a one-room hut. At Meissen, Saxony, a shoe factory is being converted into a dormitory for babies whose mothers work in the mines. Families are given home leave no oftener than every three months.

Men are taken between the ages of 17 and 50; women from 18 to 55. Many are recruited by threats of loss of ration cards. Factories are often deliberately closed to force unemployed men into the mines. Some common criminals are put to work in "penal shafts". Trade unions and the Free German Youth organization are forced to deliver monthly quotas of "volunteers". Contracts are generally for one year, but are often extended without consent. A six-month contract has had to be introduced to get new recruits. Workers are promised \$56. a month--if they can fulfill an almost impossible piecework quota. Most earn less than \$8. a month.

Financing is a closely guarded secret, but the best information indicates that Eastern Germany has had to supply all the money for the project. Preliminary ore grading is done in Germany; the entire output is exported. The three top directors of the enterprise live in Moscow and report directly to the Soviet Ministry. "The regime is, in fact, "a most blatant example of colonial exploitation...for the sole benefit of the Russian war machine".

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UNITED NATIONS

ILO

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON
FORCED LABOUR
GENEVA 1953

APPENDIX III: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Existence and Location of Camps and Number
and Compulsory Workers

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It had been observed that in the Soviet zone of Germany, the nazi technique had been taken over and improved upon. An inquiry undertaken a year ago showed that the population of concentration camps was greater at the present time than it had been in 1939. There was every reason to believe that 200,000 to 300,000 prisoners were interned in the six major and the six or seven smaller camps....

From the evidence of prisoners, it appeared that 17,000 prisoners at Buchenwald had been sent to Siberia in April 1947 and that, on 31 January 1948, 47,600 prisoners had been deported from the internment camp at Feunfeichen for labour in the Kuzbas factories in Siberia.

Some information had been obtained on the camps at Bautzen, Jamlitz and Buchenwald as well as on the MVD prisons at Pirna, Dresden and Muehlberg.

- 2 -

20, The representative of the American Federation of Labor spoke of working conditions in the uranium mines and, referring to information supplied by Dr. Fritz Lowenthal, stated--

... He himself had seen what was happening in Saxony. The work there was mainly the extraction of uranium. Theoretically, only persons of from 18 to 45 years of age could be pressed into service, but, in actual fact, children of 14 years and men of 65 and over were put to work. The workers were obliged, at any cost, to produce the minimum amount of work demanded by the occupation authorities. The work was extremely dangerous because the miners worked underground, inhaling the dangerous products emanating from radium. Mr. Lowenthal said that there were no safety devices or health safeguards in the mines. Accidents had been so frequent that it had been difficult to replace the male workers. The authorities had been obliged to introduce forced labour for women. Even pregnant women and mothers of young children had been forced to work.

21. ... and alleged that "even if there were no political purpose behind the establishment of these forced labour camps, the camps would exist because of the need for cheap and immediate production along the lines of armament needs." It then went on to quote, as an example, the working conditions in the

- 3 -

uranium mines--

The personal testimonies of those who have been sentenced to work in the Jachymow uranium mines in Czechoslovakia and the Aue mines...are consistent in their description of impossible quotas, starvation diet if the quotas or norms are not fulfilled, of the tortures which take place and the death rate due to the lack of protective clothing and machinery and the lack of sufficient or adequate medical care.

TAB

June 1, 1955

TREATY AND TRUCE OBSERVANCE - COMMUNIST STYLE

"The Bolshevik Party has had to change its tactics, its methods of combat, to shift from legal forms to illegal ones, to compromise, to make agreements with other parties, other movements, to dodge, to retreat in order to advance more successfully later".

--- Trud, Moscow, November 4, 1950

The foregoing statement is basic Communist Party doctrine regardless of locale. It was inspired by Lenin's philosophy that world power politics and diplomacy can be influenced or avoided by all sorts of stratagems, "maneuvers", "illegal methods", "evasions" and "subterfuges". This Leninist philosophy is accepted to this day as basic guidance by the Communist leaders in the Kremlin. In fact, they have no reason to question it, for to them it provides the key to survival in encountering world problems. No leadership dedicated to an ideology could ask for better logic.

The Soviet Union's record of violating treaties and truce agreements as a means of expanding its power and influence is unmatched in the history of modern diplomacy. It is a record that extends over twenty years of dealings with the United States and other powers of Europe and Asia, and it involves broken promises involving no less than fifty treaties.

- 2 -

Within a few months after the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933 the Department of State was reporting evidence tending to show violations of this Treaty. Since that time the record is replete in instances of active plotting to undermine the Government of the United States. On agreements concerning other nations the record of the Soviet Union in violating pledges to the United States is equally unfavorable. Repeatedly from 1942 until 1946, the Soviet Union promised to guarantee freedom and free elections in Hungary, in Bulgaria, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, and in Rumania. Through subversive tactics all these governments ended up with Communist dictatorships.

In Asia, the Soviet Union by Treaty in 1945 promised to support the Republic of China and to restore Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China. In complete disregard to this Treaty the Soviet Union gave unqualified political and military assistance to the Chinese Communists which resulted in the removal of the Republic of China from the mainland of China. Also, contrary to its promise to guarantee freedom for Korea, the Soviet Union organized a Communist puppet government in northern Korea, and then masterminded the invasion of Korea in actual war.

In addition to the major instances of Treaty violations the Communists have committed a series of military truce violations extending over a period of a decade and a half achieving great

- 3 -

military gains in China, Korea, and Vietnam. This method of tying the hands of a free world military establishment while Communist armies do as they please is a relatively unpublicized, but nonetheless effective device of conducting War By Cease-Fire. The Chinese Communists formalized this tactic in 1938 when they issued instructions to their military units in the field to disregard the terms of the truce with the Chinese Nationalists, and prepare for the ultimate victory of the Communist military.* Years later Chou En-lai defined the objective of War By Cease-Fire by stating that "Truce is the military counterpart of the political tactic of coalition government. It is a means to an end, not the ultimate objective".

Students of past wars have learned to look on the truce as a simple matter. Opposing armies reach a situation where both sides wish to end the fighting. A brief parley is held, lasting a few hours or at most a few days. Either a cease-fire is agreed to or the talks are broken off and the fighting continues. If there is a cease-fire, a peace settlement follows in due course and the war is over.

The words of Chou En-lai foreshadowed a total abandonment of this idea. Just as coalition government in Communist practice

* The Strategic Road of the Chinese Communist Party --- Chang Hao

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is aimed at the absorption of the coalition partner, so the military truce is aimed at the continuation of the war by other means until victory is achieved. This meaning has been spelled out in the Communist wars of aggression in China, Korea, and Vietnam*, and today the same concept hangs over the troubled waters of the Formosa Straits.

* Tabs A, ~~B, and C.~~

TAB A

WAR: BY CEASE-FIRE

The Truce Violations in China

The very ability of the Chinese Communist regime to exist and grow as a state-within-a-state for twenty years before it came to power rested in part on a military posture that was half war, half peace. Since its very beginning this regime, in its relation to the government it sought to conquer, had followed an irregular succession of tactics mixing open attack, retreat, diversion, temporary reconciliation, agitation and guerrilla warfare.

During the Japanese War, however, the Chinese Communists developed the truce as a tactic to improve their military capabilities under the guise of a "united front" with the Chinese Nationalist Government. The "united front" agreement provided for separate and agreed areas of occupation for Nationalist and Communist troops. The Communists, however, in October 1938 issued explicit directions to their cadres in the field to disregard the truce provisions of the "united front" and proceed to reinforce. ^{By way of} ~~In response to~~ implementing this directive the Communists intensified their recruiting. Then with their forces expanded by the new influx of Chinese patriot soldiers, the Communist armies began to move outside the areas assigned to them under the "united front" agreement with the Nationalists. By 1940, clashes began once again between Communist and Nationalist

- 2 -

troops and the relations of the government with its Communist rival went from bad to worse. But by this time the purpose of the truce stratagem had been largely achieved. The armies of the National Government were confronted with a Communist challenger far stronger than before.

On January 10, 1946, in an effort to secure Communist cooperation, and in order to achieve a constructive atmosphere for political discussions, which were designed to lead to a coalition government and a nationalization of all armed forces, a cease-fire or truce was agreed to by both sides. The cease-fire order stipulated:

1. A cessation of all hostilities.
2. Cessation of all movements of troops in China, with the exception of a provision permitting certain movements of Chinese Nationalist troops--especially their entry into Manchuria for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty there following the Japanese surrender to Soviet forces.
3. Cessation of destruction of and interference with all lines of communications, and
4. Establishment of an Executive Headquarters in Peiping for the purpose of carrying out the agreement for immediate cessation of hostilities.

The events which followed over the ten months of this pretended truce were a nightmare of confusion and unreality. In Chungking and Nanking, the wartime and postwar capitals of the Chinese Republic, peace talks continued--in theory at least--from January to November.

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On the battlefield there was no peace, and a truce only in name. Violations of the truce by the Communists were reported throughout this period at an average rate of about one every three days. When the truce was officially abandoned on November 19 the official count of verified Communist violations stood at not less than 91.

In self-defense the Nationalists responded to these violations by a furious renewal of the war, which spread from Manchuria throughout North China during the spring and summer. But the military initiative which the Communists gained by their violations enabled them to move a long way toward the total conquest of China.

The most significant violations were directed at strategic Manchuria, where Soviet forces after their 8-day war had accepted the Japanese surrender. Over 40 of the Communist truce violations are accounted for in this Manchurian operation. Brazenly ignoring the truce stipulation on Manchuria, their regiments and battalions marched piecemeal over mountain passes from neighboring Jehol Province until by April they had occupied most of Manchuria including the key cities of Changchun, Szepingchieh, Harbin and Tsitsihar. In each case they entered as soon as Soviet troops had left the city, conforming perfectly to the Soviet timetable of withdrawal. As an additional prize the Soviet forces handed over huge stocks of captured Japanese arms and equipment; these the Chinese Reds were to use later in organizing and equipping new armies in the final struggle for power.

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But the assist from the Soviets did not stop there. They largely nullified the Nationalists' right of entry into Manchuria, guaranteed by the truce terms, by the simple expedient of closing the port of Dairen to Nationalist ships. Thus the National Government troops were forced to enter Manchuria by air and by difficult overland routes. The whole Communist operation was beautifully conceived, smoothly executed, and completely illegal.

After furious fighting for key Manchurian communications centers, the most the Nationalists could achieve against these odds was a military stalemate which lasted from April to June. In an effort to break this stalemate and get on with the peace talks the Nationalist Government on June 7 ordered a 15-day cease-fire for its own troops in Manchuria. Later this new cease-fire was extended to the end of June. But extensive efforts to revive the peace talks were fruitless. The Communists rejected the Nationalist offer to give General Marshall the power of arbitration. The sound of guns again drowned out the peace efforts at Nanking. By summer Manchuria was mainly in Communist hands.

Meanwhile the remainder of the Communists' strategic plan began to unfold amid renewed warfare south of the Great Wall, in China proper. Here, beginning in the spring, Communist truce violations occurred with increasing frequency, aimed for the most part at a single objective: breaking Nationalist control of the north-south rail lines. Early in June these violations blazed into a general Communist offensive in North China and the Central Plain area.

The Nationalists, determined to reopen the communications system in North China, answered in July and August with a strong counter offensive.

The battle for the railroads continued throughout the summer. On August 3 the Communists began a ferocious attack on Tatung, a key rail center in northern Shansi. After 45 days the siege of Tatung was abandoned; but it was the fuse that set off major hostilities ranging over five provinces of North China--Suiyuan, Chahar, Jehol, Hopei, and Shantung.

Thus for ten months the Communists in China waged open war under the flag of truce. At last on November 19 that flag was lifted by the departure of the Communist delegation from the peace table at Nanking. The civil war, which the Communists had never stopped fighting, was now officially resumed.*

Looking back on Communist action in this period, it is possible to see with perfect clarity the military strategy they followed. It was to deny the strategic position and resources of Manchuria to Nationalist control, and to establish a corridor from west to east across North China. By the latter move they cut all China's main north-south communications routes and split the Nationalist forces into isolated commands powerless to launch a coordinated offensive.

* There was another kind of warfare during this period not waged with bullets--a cold war of propaganda. The United States was pictured by the Communists as an aggressor in Asia, the imperialist rival and successor to Japan. Appeals to Nationalist troops to desert called on them to join in opposing America as they opposed Japan. Mass propaganda claimed that United States imperialism was more refined and legal than that of Japan--but more dangerous and deadly because the United States was stronger. The history of Japanese support of Chinese puppet governments and warlords was now applied to the relation between America and the Kuomintang, which was pictured as a puppet of the United States in Communist propaganda.

At the peace table in Nanking the Communists had found they could not gain entry into a coalition government except at the price of "nationalizing" their army--thus losing the base from which they could later seize full power. So victory by diplomacy was denied to them. But they found another road leading to the same goal. Using the cover of truce and peace talks to surprise and demoralize their enemies, they carried out vital and illegal military movements and reaped a strategic advantage which the Nationalists were never to regain.

It may seem strange that the Communists were able to violate their pledged word 91 times in this period without effective hindrance from the authorities. Certainly there was no lack of efficiency in reporting the violations as they occurred. When a truce violation was complained of by either side, the Executive Headquarters in Peiping sent out a team under U.S. command to investigate and rectify the violation. After two weeks five such teams were in the field. By November there were 36 teams. They inspected, verified, reported, and protested each violation. But they had no means of commanding respect or obedience. The Communists showed only contempt for their efforts. One team in Manchuria was met with Communist gunfire. Another, sent to stop a Communist attack on Po-t'ou-chen in Hopei province, was tricked into leaving the area while the Communists resumed their attack and captured the town. Thus the prestige of the truce teams dwindled steadily. One American official was quoted as saying: "There have been so many violations I could not count them".

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The basic difficulty was simple. The only sanction against truce violations was the very act which was least desired: openly avowed renewal of the war. The irony is that precisely this sanction was applied in the end--but not until the Communists had taken a decisive step toward final victory.

TAB

VIOLATIONS OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

On 8 June 1953 an Armistice Agreement was signed between the Commander in Chief, UN Command (UNC), on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea. They agreed to accept and be bound individually, collectively and mutually by the conditions and terms as set forth in the articles of the Armistice.

How the Communists abided by these articles can be seen by the UNC charges against the Communists from the period 8 June 1953 to 1 June 1954.

1. 3405 UNC and ROK POW's Not Accounted For But Who Were Once Held by Communists.

After three amendments, the UN roster of UNC and Republic of Korea Army personnel known to have been captured and held by the Communists amounted to 3405. The list contained only names of persons who (1) spoke or were referred to in broadcasts from Communist radio stations, (2) were listed by enemy as being captives, (3) wrote letters from PW camps, or (4) were seen in PW camps. None of these had been reported by the Communists as having escaped or died, as required by paragraph 58a of the Armistice Agreement. They said part of the 3405 did not want direct repatriation, but that most had never been captured at all. In the 43d meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), KPA/CPV called the roster "crudely manufactured" and "based on no tenable data at all". The Communists said 519 had been repatriated and that 380 had been accounted for on rosters submitted to UNC as dead, escaped or released at the front. The Communists presented a tabulation of these names,

2. Failure of Communists to Report Rotation of Personnel and Combat Materiel.

The UNC implied the Communists were violating the Armistice Agreement since they were maintaining a large army yet had not reported any incoming material except one AA gun. The Communists interpreted this as a charge that they had stockpiled a large amount of material before signing the Armistice Agreement. They labeled this as a fabrication. A Mobile Inspection Team investigation at Uiju was unable to determine conclusively whether or not the Communists were introducing aircraft in crates into Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement. The UNC pointed out its more than 700 transaction reports involving more than 5,000 combat aircraft, over 400 armored vehicles, 65,000 plus weapons and several million rounds of ammunition compared to only 11 Communist reports dealing with 8 anti-tank guns, 40 rounds of anti-tank ammunition, 2 anti-aircraft guns, 7 reports on spare parts and none on combat aircraft. Communists claimed they had strictly observed the Armistice Agreement. On 18 March 1954 UNC again commented on the remarkable achievement of maintaining an army without bringing in supplies, emphasizing the Communist protestations that they had not had big stocks of materiel before signing the Armistice Agreement. The UNC charged that Neutral Nations Inspection Teams were limited in freedom to inspect while the Communists introduced combat material by by-passing ports of entry by road and rail. The Communists claimed that the Uiju inspection proved the UNC charges false and reiterated their strict compliance with the Armistice Agreement.

On 9 February 1954, the UNC sent a letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission requesting that three Mobile Inspection Teams be dispatched to investigate charges that the Communists had violated paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement by introducing reinforcing combat material at nine airfields, via two railroad complexes and by three rail and road routes. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission could not agree to honor the request.

3. Violation of Para 51, Armistice Agreement, by Forcibly Retaining and Illegally Impressi^{Three}ng Into Their Army/Republic of Korea Army Personnel Who Escaped on 19 November 1953.

On 19 November 1953, three former Republic of Korea soldiers escaped from Communist captivity, taking refuge in an UNC sentry box in the Security Area of the MAC Headquarters. The Communists refused a joint investigation and insisted these personnel belonged to their side; that UNC was forcibly retaining them, and that the three should be returned. UNC unilateral investigation disclosed true identity of the three escapees. The Communists continued to refuse a joint investigation. At MAC meeting 30 the UNC proposed a MAC letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission requesting that a Neutral Nations Inspection Team conduct an investigation of both sides' charges. The Communists rejected this. The UNC invoked paragraph 28 of the Armistice Agreement and submitted a unilateral request to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission did not act, since Poles and Czechs held that it could not investigate a violation which occurred within the Demilitarized Zone. The Communists again refused a UNC proposal for a joint investigation. On 18 January 1954 the UNC requested the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to dispatch a Mobile Inspection Team to investigate Communist

units to determine if PWs were still being forcibly retained. In a letter of 19 January 1954, Lee Sang Cho, Senior Member of the Communist side of MAC, denounced the UNC charges and advised the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission that the Communists could not agree to an investigation of the charge. This letter clearly influenced the Czechs and Poles, resulting in Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission failure to agree to dispatch the Team. The UNC was so advised on 22 January 1954. On 26 January 1954 the UNC requested another investigation of a different unit in a different locality. Again the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was unable to agree. In another letter dated 27 January 1954, Lee Sang Cho stated that only the Communists could request investigations, whereas UNC had no grounds to do so. The UNC was advised of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission's decision on 12 February 1954.

4. Violation of "Agreement on the MAC Hq. Area. Its Security and Its Construction."

During the incident (item 3 above) on 19 November 1953 the Communists introduced into the Joint Security Area of the MAC Headquarters Area a considerable number of armed men in excess of limits prescribed in paragraph IIc of the Agreement cited in title. The Communists never answered this charge.

5. Violation of Agreement of Joint Observer Team Operations (Paragraph 27 and 17 of Armistice Agreement)

Following the incident (item 3 above) in the Joint Security Area of the MAC Headquarters on 19 November 1953, the Communist component of Joint Observer Team #3 failed three times to meet with members of the UNC side after having been properly notified through the Secretaries. The Communists have never replied to this specific charge.

6. Violation of Paragraph 51 of Armistice Agreement by Forcibly Retaining Two Former Republic of Korea Army Personnel Who Escaped Communist Captivity on 10 December 1953.

Two former Republic of Korea Army soldiers, dressed in Communist uniforms, escaped from the North and voluntarily surrendered to the UNC at a point South of the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone. These persons had been impressed into the military service of the Communists. Their true identity was confirmed by UNC. UNC proposed a joint MAC letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission requesting investigation. The Communists called the charge "groundless fabrication" and "slander" and refused to agree. On 18 December 1953 the UNC made a unilateral request to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to investigate the charge of forcible retention and impressment. The Poles and Czechs took the view that the violation occurred in the North, but since the escapees were at Munsan-ni, an investigation in the South could not reveal what was going on in the North. On 22 December 1953, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission informed the UNC that its request was not agreed to. On 18 and 26 January 1954 the UNC made requests for Mobile Inspection Teams to investigate Communist units in the North. Both requests were aborted by the response of the Czech and Pole members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to the views of Lee Sang Cho as expressed in his letters of 19 and 27 January 1954. (See item 3 summary)

7. Illegal Explanation in Violation of Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 11. Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

On 20 January 1954, as the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission prepared to return the prisoners of war,

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the Communists set up public address systems to harangue the prisoners of war in the South Camps. This message was equivalent to "illegal" explanations. Also their messages threatened that prisoners of war who headed South would be killed by Communist fire from the North. The Communists never answered this specific charge.

8. Restricting the Freedom of Movement and Inspection by Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

The UNC charged that the Communists did not permit free movement of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in any of the five ports of entry in the North; allowed Neutral Nations Inspection Teams to inspect only what the Communists report, and did not permit Teams to examine manifests or shipping documents or to check train schedules. This obstructed and interfered with Neutral Nations Inspection Team performance of duty. The Communists narrow interpretation imposed a minimum freedom in the North compared to maximum freedom in the South. The Communists said they had strictly complied with the Armistice Agreement. (See 2 above) (See 9 below).

9. Illegal Introduction of Combat Aircraft at Uiju.

In October 1953, the UNC requested a Mobile Inspection Team be dispatched to Uiju to investigate a charge that the Communists were illegally introducing combat aircraft in crates. The team was dispatched. The initial inspection of the airfield, conducted on the first day after arrival, was very limited in scope and was guided by airfield commander. No evidence was found. The Swiss and Swedes wanted to inspect rail-ways and highways but the Poles and Czechs blocked this motion. On the 7th day a more extensive inspection of the airfield was made. No evidence^{was}/

uncovered. The airfield commander refused to make a satisfactory accounting for the aircraft present at the field. The Communists interpreted the negative results at Uiju as a positive indication that they adhere to Armistice Agreement and that UNC charges were "fabrications". (See 2 and 8 above.)

10. Interference with Operation of Authorized News Media Representatives.

One of the provisions of the "Understanding of Administrative Details" in connection with the Displaced Civilians Program was that news media representatives be authorized to cross the military Demarcation Line and observe operations in the reception area of the other side. When three UN accredited newsmen entered the Communist reception area on 2 March 1954 and began photographing the unloading of Koreans being assisted north by the UNC, the Communists objected and forced the newsmen to return to their vehicle.

The UNC protest in the 38 MAC meeting was followed up in the 39th meeting by an offer to receive any suggested revision of the particular paragraphs of the agreement on the Displaced Civilian Program which would permit the Communists to understand the agreement better.

The Communists replied to the charge made at the 38th meeting by charging the UNC with violating the same provisions of the agreement by sending the newsmen across the Military Demarcation Line. Their reply to the suggestion in the 39th meeting that they might want to propose a revision of the agreement was to the effect that if the UNC wanted a change, the UNC could submit it, but that the Communists felt their concept was correct.

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11. Failure in Displaced Civilian Program.

The Communist charge that the UNC was abducting Korean civilians was countered by a UNC charge that the Communists were merely covering up for their failure to attract returnees and to carry out the provisions of paragraph 59 of the Armistice Agreement. Paragraph 59 related to the transfer of civilians between North and South. The UNC challenged the Communist claim that they had "publicized widely" the contents of paragraph 59, calling this a relative matter and pointing out that as of 18 February 1954 Communists had publicized the article for only six days compared to UNC's 35 days. The UNC quoted Radio Peking's report that registration had been completed in the North; explained that paragraph 59 does not limit the duration of registration; and called on Communists to repudiate Radio Peking. The UNC charged that the Communist program had been inadequate giving only "lip service" to the publicity required by paragraph 59. The UNC said that no genuine registration procedure existed and the above facts indicated a premeditated plan to deliberately avoid fulfillment of the requirements of paragraph 59, and so charged the Communists. The UNC also charged Communists with brutality and inhumanity in the long marches and imprisonment imposed on civilians. At a Staff Officers meeting on 18 February 1954, the UNC gave the Communists a roster of 2,831 Republic of Korea officials who had been kidnapped from Seoul by the Communists and requested that these 2,831 be informed of their opportunity to return to the South. In MAC 38 and 39, the UNC asked Communists for an answer to this request, reminding them that no reply had been received. The Communists called the UNC charges groundless slanders,

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and maintained that they had complied strictly with paragraph 59. This Communist attitude continued in MAC meetings 42 and 43, after the UNC again reminded them they they had still failed to reply regarding the 2,831 Republic of Korea civilians.

12. Conspiracy of KPA/CPV, Czechs, and Poles to Discredit UNC.

The UNC claimed that the Czechs and Poles were endeavoring to whitewash the KPA/CPV and blacken the reputation of the UNC by deliberate unneutral acts, distortions of facts, confusing simple reporting procedures, creating disorder, harassing and frustrating UNC efforts and picking at minutia, while condoning and protecting the KPA/CPV procedures in the North.

13. In addition to the above, the allegations of air and ground violations of the Demilitarized Zone were as follows:

UNC Charges Against Communists

Ground

Charged	-	11
Denied	-	6
Admitted	-	2
Incomplete	-	3

Air

Charged	--	40
Denied	--	15
Admitted	-	-
Incomplete	-	25

TAB

June 3, 1955

COMMUNIST TRUCE VIOLATIONS - INDOCHINA

On April 26, 1954, the Geneva Conference met to discuss the possibility of restoring peace in Indochina.

In July 1954, Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina were issued by the Conference.

By mid-August 1954 protestations of violations of these Agreements by the Communists began to pour into the International Control Commission.

I.

Viet Minh Violations of The Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities - Indochina

Reasons. - The Viet Minh has given clear evidence that its activities are a part of Communist world strategy rather than a local Vietnamese movement. The death of Stalin gave Viet Minh leaders a perfect opportunity to reassert openly both their allegiance to international Communism and their aim of establishing an integrated Communist regime based on that of the Soviet Union and the Peiping regime.

In an article in "The People's Army", March 1953, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minister of the Viet Minh, quoted President Ho Chi Minh's oath "always to be strictly bound to the Soviet Union and to follow exactly the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin." This was only one of many statements made by top party officials. Viewed in the light of such utterances, and the experiences in China and Korea, the Viet Minh can be expected to comply with the tenets of international Communism of which cease-fire violations are a part.

History. - In Communist doctrine a truce or "cease-fire" is a means to an end, not the ultimate objective. Therefore, the Communists have no

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compunction about violating a cease-fire whenever it appears advantageous to do so. As in China during the political negotiations in 1946, the cease-fire was (and still is) a means of gaining a respite. The respite gives the Communists an opportunity to strengthen their forces while their opponent abides by the "cease-fire rules", relaxes his guard, and loses whatever advantage he may have possessed. The period of truce is accompanied by a propaganda barrage of "peace" or "coexistence", while a gradual build-up of Communist forces takes place. Subversive cadres infiltrate non-Communist areas and set up their Communist administrations either overtly or covertly.

The over-all program for Southeast Asia was formalized in Peiping six years ago (1949). At that time and in that place the World Federation of Trade Unions* sponsored what was termed a Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries. Actually, it was a meeting to set up the usual program of guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity, subversive "united front" arrangements, labor strife and intensive pro-Communist and anti-democratic propaganda.

To maintain a facade of peaceful intentions, the Communists depend largely on infiltration and subversion. These prepare the ground for "free elections" Communist style and, if the elections fail, the Communists are prepared to resort to force. The Geneva Agreements have scheduled

*The WFTU which organizes congresses, meetings and training courses has provided an opportunity for meetings of Communists and sympathizers all over the world. At the meetings they discuss the most effective methods of local application of the directives laid down by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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the elections in Vietnam for 1956. In South Vietnam all conditions for subversion are favorable, in addition to the fact that the population has grown apathetic in the face of constant terror and a powerful military threat from the North.

In such fertile ground the Communists are busy at one of their favorite tasks, that of absorbing and disrupting by politico-subversive methods the functions of a government. Contrary to the provisions and spirit of the truce agreement they have been establishing Communist forms of government in areas under control of the South Vietnam Government, and thus are threatening existence of that government.

Politico-Subversive Cadres and Guerrilla Operations

Although much publicity has been given to guerrilla operations, the main threat is in the politico-subversive cadres which establish the underground governments. In Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, these cadres are guided and controlled by the Lao Dong Labor Party (Communist Party), while the guerrillas are under the control of the Defense Ministry. Thus the guerrillas receive orders from the political cadres whom they support.

In South Vietnam the combined politico-guerrilla operations of the Viet Minh have three primary missions:

1. Establishment of Communist local governmental control machinery in areas nominally under non-Communist control. This technique enables the Communists to establish "base areas" in support of military operations long before the actual consolidation of the "Revolutionary" government.
2. Support of military operations.
3. Intelligence.

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The steps in the process of forming Communist underground governments are:

Politico-subversive cadres, organized with great care and detail, with armed (guerrilla) support are sent into the area to establish provincial, county and city governments. Governmental functions are set up. On paper these functions (listed below) give an appearance of benevolence and efficiency but in practice show up the duplicity and sham of the Vietminh, the illusory nature of the benefits they promise ending in the final subjugation of the population for the benefit of the state.

Provisional People's Committee (Underground)

<u>Section</u>	<u>Duties</u>
1. Staff Member Guidance	Selects and recommends persons for appointment in Provisional People's Committee.
2. Confidential	Processes important documents; inspects districts.
3. Finance	Taxes, records government property and issues licenses.
4. Labor	Handles pensions, insurance planning; settles labor disputes, improves conditions, conscripts labor.
5. Health	Inspects facilities; distributes relief planning of medical supplies and sanitation.
6. Purchasing	Purchases monopoly goods for resale to public.
7. Education	Establishes primary level schools; selects, appoints, discharges teachers; inspects schools.
8. Planning	Compiles and maintains statistics and records.

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<u>Section</u>	<u>Duties</u>
9. Food Administration	Maintains food rationing system.
10. Agriculture Production	Handles agriculture affairs, provides aid to farmers, taxes farm products.
11. Livestock Production	Improves, immunizes livestock; grants permission for slaughtering.
12. Propaganda	Explains government policies, conducts indoctrination, propaganda and agitation.
13. Forestry	Maintains conservation of forest.
14. Road and Building	Maintains road and buildings, community planning.
15. General Affairs	Miscellaneous affairs not covered in other sections.

Once the above functions take some semblance of order, the Communists immediately begin to establish training courses for all new members, they found "liberation schools" to indoctrinate the population, organize party programs and newspapers for propaganda purposes. While "investigating" the problem of land distribution, the Communists actually start distribution (a favorite Communist tactic) in order to secure popular support. The peasant who yearns to own land is unaware that upon the completion of the communization process he will neither own the land nor the fruits of his own work.

International Control Commissions and Their Problems

A control commission can only be effective if both sides act in good faith. In Indochina, through its many violations (some of which are mentioned in this paper and the annex) the Viet Minh has flaunted the authority of the Commissions. It has substantially increased the capabilities of its regular army in North Vietnam and has retained a significant capability for political and para-military operations in South Vietnam,

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Cambodia and Laos. The Viet Minh has:

1. augmented the material strength of its armed forces by shipments of military equipment from Communist China;
2. failed to evacuate all military personnel from South Vietnam and Cambodia;
3. consistently sought to consolidate administrative and political authority in areas under the de jure authority of the governments of South Vietnam and Laos;
4. failed to permit the free movement of refugees;
5. failed to observe the cease-fire in Laos.

The Commissions are working under handicaps which are directly due to the provisions of the accord. This was true in China during the cease-fire negotiations; it was true in Korea and now in Indochina. The composition of the Commissions, which includes Communists, makes unanimous agreement almost impossible on certain questions. In China, Korea and Indochina, the Commissions have the choice of uncritical acceptance of assurances given by the Communists or the almost impossible task of carrying out an effective investigation in an atmosphere of terror and deceit.

II.

Communist Reaction to Exposure of Cease-Fire Violations

The Communists will continue to resort to their usual technique of using a highly-organized propaganda machine to accuse others, especially the United States, of the type of violations of which they are guilty. The Communists have intensified their anti-U.S. campaign to such an extent that the Viet Minh press is devoting 50 percent of its space to articles denouncing American imperialism. This technique has been successful in

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the past in propagandizing people under their control as well as in neutral countries. Any confusion works to the benefit of the Communists since they violate the "cease-fire" deliberately for strategic reasons.

III.

Reasons for Communist Violations

The Communists' aim is a united Indochina (including Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam) under a Communist Government. In a public statement on September 2, the ninth anniversary of the Viet Minh independence, Ho Chi Minh declared that "victory will be ours." Throughout the speech the goal of unity, independence and democracy was repeatedly emphasized. Ho reiterated anti-United States and anti-colonial sentiments and appealed for united opposition. The speech indicates the Viet Minh determination to gain control of all Indochina. He implied that this control will be achieved by political action, but that the Viet Minh intends to regroup their Army and hold it in readiness for any eventuality.

The Viet Minh efforts will continue to take the following shape in the three Associated States:

1. Laos. - Expanded Pathet Lao (Communist) forces will continue to evade and break the truce agreement and to consolidate their control over Northern Laos. Attacks on the Laotian National Army units have been resumed. These will be designed to enlist popular support by chalking up Pathet Lao successes. (Two Laotian National Army commando posts were attacked by Pathet Lao forces on January 12. The attacks occurred just after the ICC mobile team left the area.) As recently as April 23, 1,000 Pathet Lao troops attacked the 600-man garrison in Sam Neua Province.

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2. Vietnam. - The Viet Minh will expand underground in the South using their politico-subversive and terror techniques. They will be aimed at having de facto control pass to Ho Chi Minh without too much overt disturbance. If the Communists fail to win the elections in 1956, a swift coup may be attempted. (On December 19, 1946, Ho Chi Minh openly broke the then "cease-fire" agreement with massacres in Hanoi, Tourane and Hue).
3. Cambodia. - The Viet Minh foothold is the weakest in this area, especially since the strong and successful stand by the Cambodians at Geneva against a Viet Minh regrouping area inside the state. But once the Communist control all Vietnam and Laos, Cambodia may be powerless to resist.

IV.

Conclusion

The International Control Commission has been prevented by Communist delaying tactics and by collusion between the Polish delegation and the Viet Minh, from investigating and fixing responsibility for major Viet Minh violations of the Geneva Agreements. But in spite of any positive results the International Control Commission may achieve, violations may be expected to continue until such a time as ^{the} indigenous governments become considerably stronger, the Communists take over all of Indochina by politico-subversive methods or there is a resumption of hostilities.

ANNEX

VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS (JULY 1954) ON CESSATION OF
HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA

This Annex on the violations of the agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia presents evidence of the pre-meditated pattern of the numerous violations committed by the Communists. Pertinent examples were chosen from the compilation of violations in order to illustrate how a "cease-fire" is one of the instruments of Communist policy. The main points of this Communist cease-fire policy are:

1. Strengthening and regrouping of military forces - Articles 15, 17 and paras. 4, 12, Joint Conference Declaration (Vietnam); Articles 4(c), 13(2), 15 and paras. 3, 4, 12, Joint Conference Declaration (Laos); paras. 3, 4, 12, Joint Conference Declaration (Cambodia).
2. Establishment of politico-subversive cadres or underground governments - Articles 14(a), 14(b), 15 (Vietnam); 4(c), 13(2) (Laos); Art. 4 (Cambodia).
3. Creating an atmosphere of fear and terror by reprisals and impeding refugee travel - Articles 14(c), 14d and para. 8 (Vietnam).
4. Failure to exchange all prisoners of war and liberate political prisoners - Article 21.

Art. 4 (Cambodia) deals with the withdrawal of the foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel from the territory of Cambodia.

Official estimates at the time of the cease-fire agreement held that the number of Viet Minh regular and irregular forces in Cambodia totalled

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8,000. The Viet Minh, informed the International Control Commission that 4,050 Viet Minh regulars were to be evacuated from Cambodia by October 19, 1954. Only about 2,700 regulars had been withdrawn. These evacuees carried a bare minimum of armament far below the actual strength of the units. The Viet Minh have intentionally left behind substantial cadres and arms depots for subversive purposes and future armed dissidence.

In Battambang province the Viet Minh had announced an anticipated 450 evacuees; only 250 materialized.

The Khmer-Viet Minh forces in Cambodia were not disarmed by the Viet Minh by August 22, 1954, as specified in the cease-fire agreement.

Arts. 4(c) and 13(2) (Laos) deal with the routes for withdrawal of forces of the ...Vietnamese People's Volunteers in Laos from Laotian territory which are to be fixed on the spot by the Joint Commission.

The Viet Minh have utilized secret withdrawal routes to avoid detection of abducted Laotian personnel. The specific charge against the Viet Minh, laid before the plenary session of the International Control Commission on September 29, 1954, was the use of secret routes in the transport of troops or transport of troops on stipulated routes without notification to the Commission of the exact time in order to avoid inspection.*

*The intention of the Pathet Lao Communists in Laos, according to a captured Viet Minh document, is ostensibly to conform with the cease-fire agreement but actually to leave cells behind them as they withdraw; to take with them for training and indoctrination as many young Laotians as possible; and to build up the Pathet Lao with the intention of ultimately taking over the country.

Arts. 14(a) and (b) (Vietnam) state that the conduct of the civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped, and that after transfer and complete evacuation of troops the other party shall assume responsibility.

Provisional Assembly Areas. Most of the Viet Minh areas south of the 17th Parallel, i.e., the Provisional Assembly Areas of CA Mau, Xuyen Moc and Plaine des Jones, have been technically evacuated by Viet Minh forces. Repeated and consistent reports reveal that Viet Minh military-political cadres continue to retain de facto control of the local administration and to conduct activities designed to maintain the population under Communist control. In the Plaine des Jones area alone, only an estimated 14,000 Viet Minh evacuees have been withdrawn from an announced quota of 20,000.

Arts. 14(c) (Vietnam), 15 (Laos), 6 (Cambodia), declare that each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee democratic liberties.

The Vietnamese Government has formally charged that on July 31, 1954, the Viet Minh assassinated Le Van Qui, non-commissioned officer of the regional militia (Bao Chinh Quan) at Ngo Duong Huyen de An-Duong (Kien An province), North Vietnam. Intellectuals and landowners were forced to wear military uniforms so their forced evacuation with Viet Minh troops will go undetected.

The Vietnamese Government has charged that on August 21, 1954, three members of the Viet Minh, armed with rifles, attacked agents of the Hanoi Security Service near the Lang Pagoda.

Refugees from the Red River delta asserted that some teachers who had chosen to stay within the Viet Minh zones and had declared their

loyalty to the Viet Minh had, nevertheless, been arrested and thrown into cages for public exhibition. A Viet Minh agent was carrying secret orders for the assassination of certain Vietnamese in the Phu Tien area prior to the withdrawal of the Viet Minh forces. The marked men were those believed to be strongly anti-Viet Minh and possibly aware that the Viet Minh was leaving behind cells and arms cadres.

Art. 14(d) and Para. 8 of the Joint Conference Declaration (Vietnam) state that from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

During October, members of three regular infantry divisions and local regional forces were blocking, by force, the movement of refugees in the south zone of the delta. The Viet Minh has been preventing and continues to prevent evacuation of people from this area by:

1. Intimidation and force. - Refugees encounter roadblocks where soldiers refuse them permission to pass, separate children from parents and arrest leaders of groups. Armed Viet Minh junks patrol the coastal waters to prevent escape by sea, and departing boats are fired upon.
2. Barring refugees from transportation. - Almost all travel in the Tonkin Delta requires water transportation, but Viet Minh officials control passenger boats, ferry boats and bridges and prevent their use by refugees. Trucks, busses, and bicycle carts are forbidden to carry refugees.
3. Economic penalties. - A would-be refugee is not allowed to sell his property but must forfeit all except that which he can carry.

Public charges that the Viet Minh was obstructing the free movement of refugees from North Vietnam were set forth as early as September 25, 1954, when Premier Ngo Dinh Diem asserted that Viet Minh authorities were obstructing the departure of 200,000 Vietnamese from North Vietnam.

The Vietnamese Government has charged that on August 18, 20, and 22, 1954, members of the Viet Minh distributed tracts at Hanoi and Haiphong maligning the National Government of Vietnam and exhorting the population not to evacuate.

Flagrant infraction of the Geneva Agreement occurred during late October and early November 1954 when, according to some press service estimates, from 20,000 to 40,000 Catholic and Buddhist refugees sought to flee the provinces of Nam Dinh and Thai Binh, North Vietnam in the face of a determined Viet Minh effort to thwart their departure.

On October 30, 1954, representatives of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in Vietnam reported that "thousands" of Vietnamese desirous of leaving Viet Minh zones were forcibly being prevented from doing so. Viet Minh agents and militia, it was said, struggled physically with the refugees; strangled an elderly Catholic to death; fired on boats of refugees as they pulled away from shore; patrolled the roads leading from the villages to the beach; forced the inhabitants of non-Christian villages to come out and grapple with departing refugees and to snatch babies from refugee mothers so as to force the mothers to remain; and attempted to prevent refugees from buying food so as to force them to return to their villages from sheer hunger.

On November 6, 1954, [] reported that until October 27, 1954, the Viet Minh sought to thwart refugee departures by any means short

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of the actual use of firearms. On the night of October 27, however, the Viet Minh machinegunned two sailing boats and wounded several refugees. French authorities reported at least four instances in which the Viet Minh had fired on refugees. (As evidence, the Haiphong team of the International Armistice Commission was reportedly confronted with the wounded refugees and two boats--one with bullet marks on its side and on one oar, the other with a bullet-pierced mast.) By November 3, 1954, the Viet Minh was said to have buttressed its internal efforts to prevent refugee departures with armed junks that patrolled the Bui Chu coast. Thus, a double barrier was erected before the fleeing refugees.

On November 9, 1954, Western press services reported that some 4,000 to 5,000 Catholic refugees had managed to reach on November 8 the sandbar island of Tra Ly, a few miles off the coast of Thai Binh province, where they were stranded and in danger of drowning at high tide.

French efforts to rescue these refugees by sea were met immediately by strong Viet Minh protests. Their memorandum to the French High Command on November 10 termed French rescue efforts an "infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of the Vietnam Democratic Republic" and the French were warned that they would be held fully responsible "for eventual incidents if the above-mentioned acts of violation continue." A strong protest against the Viet Minh's attitude in this regard was lodged with the International Armistice Commission by the head of the French military mission in Hanoi on November 10, 1954; and despite Viet Minh and Polish attempts to delay an investigation of the situation, three mobile teams were dispatched by the Commission into the area of Nam Dinh and Phat Diem.

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On November 13, [] reported that the Viet Minh continued to treat "intended" refugees with such violences that it was becoming an "international disgrace." "The Viet Minh have been using physical violence ranging from bludgeoning to gunfire." Regarding the activities of the International Armistice Commission's investigatory teams, [] [] reported that a request by the Commission to the Viet Minh for permission to allow French ships or trucks to evacuate refugees or at least to permit a mobile Commission team to go by French ship or helicopter to Tra Ly immediately, was refused. Instead, the Viet Minh is said to have offered to allow the Commission to go by road to the coast near Tra Ly after a 24-hour delay for "preparations." The Viet Minh threatened to fire on any ship or helicopter that approached the area. A Saigon press release stated that upon Commission intervention, the Viet Minh had agreed to permit French ships to enter its "territorial" waters if the Commission was given prior notice each time and if a member of the Commission was aboard the ship concerned. However, the existence of such an agreement was denied by the head of the French military mission in Vietnam who stated that the Viet Minh had thus far refused all such requests.

The Viet Minh has assured the Commission that it would do nothing to prevent refugee departures. Yet, refugees in Haiphong continued to charge that they are being hampered by the Viet Minh in their efforts to reach areas in which the International Armistice Commission team is operating. It may be significant in this regard that the transportation of refugees from Phat Diem to the Haiphong perimeter where they were turned over to French authority was being carried out almost exclusively by water and in Viet Minh craft. Thus, the Viet Minh has the opportunity at least to

continue its obstructive tactics during the long river voyage if it chooses to do so.

It has been ascertained that (1) during the period November 4-11, French ships picked up approximately 10,000 refugees from the Tonkin delta coast; (2) the International Armistice Commission teams dispatched to investigate the Catholic refugee situation have not been given full freedom of movement by the Viet Minh; (3) members of these teams were unable to ascertain the condition of the refugees stranded on the Tra Ly sandbar; and (4) the Viet Minh, with the aid of the Polish members of the Commission, have been dilatory and obstructionist to the detriment of the Commission's efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with the rapidly evolving refugee situation.

Art. 15 (Vietnam) states that there shall take place a disengagement of the combatants, transfer of military forces, equipment and supplies of each party. The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage. They shall permit no interference in local administration.

The Vietnamese Government has cited truce-violation incidents such as:

1. The clandestine reinforcement of troops in Quang Tri province on September 1, 1954.
2. The incitation of popular demonstrations against the authority of the Vietnamese Government and Army.
3. The organization of guerrilla units below the 17th parallel.
4. The propagation of pro-Viet Minh propaganda below the 17th parallel.

Art. 17 (Vietnam) declares that the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material is prohibited.

The Joint Sino-Soviet-DRV Supply and Service Command in Nanning, China, has moved large quantities of prohibited war material such as heavy artillery and Soviet rocket launchers to North Vietnam. Since the cease-fire, artillery, including 105 mm. cannon, was sent across the Sino-Vietnamese border. Material received since the Armistice represents a substantial increase in the inventory of Viet Minh artillery pieces, bazookas and mortars. New items in Viet Minh hands include tanks and 88 mm. anti-aircraft weapons. Aside from these, military-type aircraft have been sighted at Hanoi.

The Viet Minh Regular Forces have been expanded. Reorganization of their forces indicates that up to nine new divisions have been or are now being formed, including three artillery divisions and six infantry divisions. These increases are the result of transfers from regional and popular forces. In addition, support elements of existing units are being augmented to include a larger proportion of organic artillery, heavy mortar, and recoilless gun components at divisional and regimental level. The expansion and reinforcement of unit firepower was made possible by continuing large shipments of Chinese Communist supplies.

Arts. 21 (Vietnam), 16 (Laos), 8 (Cambodia) deal with the liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees within 30 days.

The Vietnamese Government as of September 3, 1954, charged that the Viet Minh had failed to liberate the chief of the sub-district of Luong Duong

(Thai Binh province), North Vietnam.

Officials in Saigon have estimated that at the end of hostilities, 55,000 members of the French Union forces were unaccounted for. Of this number 25,000 were of Vietnamese nationality. By September 4, 1954, the Viet Minh claimed to have returned 11,882 prisoners (537 officers and 11,345 other military personnel), of whom 8,082 were of European or African origin, 5 of U.S. origin and 3,795 of Vietnamese origin. The French Union High Command, however, claimed that only 11,706 were released.

The Viet Minh returned only 3,795 of the Vietnamese Army personnel captured by them during the war. Although some of the men not officially returned are either still interned as "politically dangerous" or have been clandestinely released after indoctrination, the major portion have been removed from the category of prisoners of war and integrated into the Viet Minh forces.

The presence of a camp near Nom Dau holding French Union prisoners has been reported. The Viet Minh, however, claimed that these POW's are French Expeditionary Corps deserters who have rallied to its side. Hundreds of Legionnaires and North Africans have returned to Europe and North Africa via Communist China and the Soviet Union. This method of releasing European POW's to their home country is a prominent aspect of Viet Minh POW policies.

Another favorite Communist practice is to sentence large numbers of prisoners of war as war criminals.

Paras. 3 and 12 of the Joint Conference Declaration (Laos) state that in their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, the Viet Minh will respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states.

As early as August 27, 1954, the Laotian Government protested to the Joint Armistice Commission for Laos that Viet Minh units in Laos were forcing young men in the villages to join Viet Minh forces and move to northern Laos for military training.

Official Laos reports on October 17, 1954, asserted that through threats, intimidation and false promises, the Viet Minh had forcibly taken away between 4,000 and 5,000 persons.

On January 31, 1955, Viet Minh elements crossed the Lao border into Laos to reinforce the Pathet Lao (Communist).

In addition to the above violations of which only certain examples are listed, there have been violations of Articles 10, 11 and 15c (Attacks Against Vietnamese Army and Militia Units); violations of Articles 1, 2a, 4d and 19 (Attacks Against Laos National Army Units); violations of Articles 2 and 4(4) (Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia); and violation of Article 5 (Demobilization of Khmer Resistance Forces).

TAB

April 11, 1955

COMMUNIST DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL
1955

On November 24, 1954, the Chinese Communists announced over the Peiping Radio that a Chinese military tribunal had imposed long prison sentences on 11 American flyers and two other U.S. citizens who were in the employ of the U.S. Army.

The announcement concerning the 13 Americans had far deeper significance than was realized by the Western World. It calls for a reappraisal of Communist motives in detaining and utilizing prisoners of war and a reappraisal of Communist law and legal proceedings as interpreted by their "administrators."

Policy of Detention and Exploitation

Since the cease-fire in Korea the United Nations Command has asked for an accounting of 470 United States and 2,410/^{South}Korean prisoners of war known to have been in Communist hands. In addition, 15 United States fliers are held in China; 41 United States civilians are being held by the Communists. Information recently available has revealed that U.S. prisoners were taken to Siberia in late 1951 and 1952. U.S. prisoners were observed during this period at Man Chou Li, which is the transfer point on the border of Manchuria and the USSR. Two trainloads of prisoners were transferred from Chinese trains to Soviet trains on the Siberian side of the border. Among the prisoners were large numbers of Negro troops.

The calloused and inhuman policy of the Communists, Soviet and Chinese, toward prisoners of war in Korea resulted in the disappearance of 65,000 men of the United Nations Command. Of this number, 11,600 were victims

of war crimes. During the truce negotiations the UN Command asked the Communists for an accounting of 53,000 Republic of Korea soldiers captured by the Communists. The Communists claimed they had been "released at the front." Since that time thousands of these soldiers have escaped to South Korea and have revealed that the term "released at the front" is a cover phrase employed by the Communists to hide forcible impressment into their armies or in prisoner-of-war slave labor battalions.

The utilization of these prisoners falls into two chief categories-- one for the soldiers of the Republic of Korea, the other for those of the United States and other countries of the United Nations Command.

1. The Republic of Korea.

- a. Forced impressment into the North Korean Armed Forces.
- b. Impressment into labor battalions in support of the Communist war effort and international goals.
- c. Training for espionage, sabotage or other subversive activities.
- d. Purposes of propaganda.

2. U.S. and other UN countries.

- a. Selected prisoners of war for propaganda work (some of those in the Soviet Union will be used as radio announcers of which there is a shortage in the USSR).
- b. Converted prisoners of war, screened by the Soviets, will be trained to be illegal residents in the U.S. or other countries where they can live as Americans.
- c. The identities and biographies of dead or even living prisoners of war will be used in preparing legends for Soviet agents.

Those prisoners of war who are found to be unsuitable will rarely be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet handling techniques and the Soviets would be condemned for withholding UN prisoners captured in Korea.

History of Detention and Utilization

The exploitation of prisoners of war by the Communists is not new. It is an important aspect of their struggle for world domination in which they use every illegal and even legal opportunity to further their own ends. Enormous economic, military, and propaganda advantages were and are drawn by the Soviets in using these men.

In the Korean War the same policy of exploitation was put into effect by the Chinese Communists under the supervision of the Soviets. This time it included all countries under United Nations Command.

The Soviet advisory system which in Korea exerted direct control over all important policy-making departments, extended to matters dealing with prisoners of war. This resulted in a control-system in prison-of-war camps in North Korea dominated at the top levels by Soviet officers.

Current Detention - Prison Sentences.

The events behind the current detention of the 11 U.S. fliers and 2 U.S. Army civilians, as broadcast by the Peiping Radio, are a matter of record. The fliers, officers and crew of a B-29, flying a United Nations leaflet dropping mission, were shot down on January 12, 1953 over North Korea. It was not the only plane shot down by the Chinese Communists, but it happened to carry a sufficient number of high-ranking officers to supply propaganda material for the mock trial that had been taking place--- a type of trial with which the world is now, unhappily, only too familiar.

The detention and illegal use of prisoners of war is deliberate Soviet policy. Long standard components of the Communist overall strategy, they are insidiously planned to achieve a far-reaching goal. The Soviets have successfully instructed the Chinese, North Korean and Viet Minh Communists in their own techniques of exploiting prisoners of war for political, psychological and subversive reasons. Having learned their lessons well, the Chinese Communists then claimed that all United Nations prisoners taking part in the "unjust war" were war criminals. The Chinese told the captured soldiers that they of the United Nations Command had been duped and misled by their reactionary rulers and that therefore certain prisoners should not be executed but would be given the opportunity to repent for their crimes.

In light of this policy, the sentencing of the U.S. airmen and civilians did not come as a surprise. The move was a premeditated propaganda move, planned as far back as July 3, 1952. Neither were the actual sentences resulting from the trials in doubt. The question was purely one of proper timing for political expediency.

On July 3, 1952, six months before the plane containing the sentenced crew was shot down, another RB-29 photo-reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over North Korea. On January 25, 1953, the crew under the command of Lt. Theodore R. Harris was taken to Mukden, Manchuria. For more than 8 months, Lt. Harris and his crew were subjected to every device known to the Chinese from moral pressure to extreme physical torture. Following this a mock trial was held in Mukden which clearly showed the Communists' disregard for all rules and regulations of justice as known to the Western world. To quote some of Lt. Harris' own words:

"I remained in this cell approximately 6 weeks. During this period I was brought almost daily before what was explained to me as a 'military court' to sit in judgment of my case. I repeatedly asked by what authority I was held by the Chinese People's military, and by what authority I had been removed from Korea. I never received any answer or reason. On one occasion I asked that if this were a court and I was being tried, why was I denied counsel. I did not receive a satisfactory reply.

"Throughout the course of this so-called trial whenever I attempted to speak out in my own behalf or to refute any of the questions or charges, the officer-in-charge would fly into a rage and in most cases would break off the proceedings. During much of this mock trial I was forced to stand at rigid attention while the questions were asked. Most of the questions asked during this trial were irrelevant, but there was emphasis on the bacteriological warfare charges, espionage, psychological warfare, and violation of the sovereign territory of the People's Republic of China. Considerable emphasis was given the charge that I had repeatedly violated the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union. I was told that I had to confess and if I confessed, the Chinese People's Republic would forgive me and thereafter treat me as a prisoner-of-war instead of a war criminal."

On January 12, 1953, a B-29 carrying Col. John K. Arnold was shot down over North Korea. In the aircraft were a full colonel, a major, two/ captains and two lieutenants. The Harris crew was returned to Korea and later repatriated while the Arnold crew was taken to China. The higher ranking officers--and the crew--of the Arnold plane were better fodder for the propaganda trials than were the staff of the Harris plane.

Soviet-Chinese "Legal" Proceedings.

The Soviet textbook on international law, published by the Institute of Law of the Academy of Science of the USSR (Moscow 1951), contains a section on "Scouts and Spies" which reads: "A serviceman in uniform who penetrates into enemy lines and the rear of the enemy cannot be considered a spy." This section is international window-dressing. ~~For~~ Whenever it suits their purposes, the Soviets disregard their own textbook promulgations.

The Chinese Communists have followed in the footsteps of the Soviets. The 11 U.S. fliers and 2 civilians were "convicted" by the so-called Military Tribunal of the "Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China." The chief judge was Chia Chien, a committee member of the "Supreme People's Court." The defendants were prosecuted by Yao Lun "Military Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Republic of China."

The above Soviet type of "court" and "procuratorate", sham and political in nature, has become standard with the Chinese Communists and is used to give some semblance of legality to whatever strategy they are about to implement. Most criminal of these facades-of-justice operations were those conducted by the Communist regime during 1950-54 when some 20,000,000 Chinese were slaughtered in 7 gigantic terror campaigns.

These political courts and the judicial officers concerned with carrying out the policies and programs of the Peiping regime, used the judiciary as an instrument of oppression. In all civil and criminal cases, the judge is guided by the orders and directives of the Communist regime and the decisions of earlier Communist trials, unless some policy, recently changed, makes it expedient to render a different decision. These decisions are handed down by the political and legal committee under the State Administration Council which is the policy-making organization in the Peiping regime for all judicial matters.

Propaganda Tie-In

Well timed with the Peiping radio farce was the release of John Helmuth Noble and two other U.S. civilians from the Soviet Union. Obviously the Communist brethren were attempting to create an impression of magnanimity in order to make the free world believe that they were not intransigent in their dealings with prisoners of war. The conclusion, they hoped, would be that the 11 fliers were genuine spies. By releasing the three Americans, the Communists also hoped to further a number of their political and propaganda maneuvers: the embarrassment of the United States; the Red Chinese claim to Formosa; the justification of the entry of Red China into the United Nations; diversion of attention from their subversive moves in Southeast Asia.

To recapitulate--the exploitation of prisoners of war is a regular component of Communist policy. Until such a time as the United States and the United Nations destroy the usefulness of "prisoners of war" as a Communist weapon, the Communists will continue to utilize them to further their far-reaching objective of world domination.